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I. Introduction 
This paper provides an initial, schematic description for students beginning a course comparing 
the "company laws"
1 governing corporations formed under the Delaware General Corporation Law 
(also referred here to as "DGCL")
2 and under the German Aktiengesetz (also referred to here as the 
"Stock Corporation Act" or "AktG").
3  Before students can usefully compare the corporate laws of two 
or more countries, they need to have some idea of what is included within such bodies of law and, in 
particular, whether provisions or principles of law from other topical areas or jurisdictions serve to 
                                                   
*  Research Associate, Institute for Law and Finance, and Doctoral Candidate Johann Wolfgang Goethe-
Universität, Frankfurt am Main. 
1   This paper will use the terms "company" law and "corporate" law indistinguishably. "Corporate law" is a 
US term and "company" law is used in the United Kingdom, as well as in the English language versions 
of EU legislation.  From a German perspective, the term "corporate" law might be more accurate for this 
paper, as it focuses on stock corporations that may well be large enough to be listed on a stock exchange, 
an area of study that German scholars might call "law of capital collecting companies" 
(Kapitalgesellschaftsrecht), as opposed to "company law" ( Gesellschaftsrecht), which would likely 
include various forms of partnerships and limited liability companies (Gesellschaften mit beschrankten 
Haftung), as well as stock corporations (Aktiengesellschaften).  The German understanding of the term 
"company law" might be rendered as "corporations and other business organizations." 
2   Delaware Code Annotated, title 8. 
3   Law of September 6, 1965, as last amended on December 15, 2004 (Federal Law Reporter Vol.  I, p. 
3408). The Laws Applicable to Corporations 
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constitute what is understood as  "corporate" or "company" law in the jurisdiction studied.  That is, 
they need to understand why other topical laws ( such as securities or bankruptcy laws) might be 
included within the object "company law", and how rules from different jurisdictions (such as state, 
federal, supranational or even private organizations) join together to constitute the relevant area of this 
company law.  This should include an analysis of how the rules issued by the various jurisdictions 
interact with each other.  Because such an introduction is factual and descriptive in character, and 
attempts to depict the topical and jurisdictional composition of the sets of laws, it should also be able 
to shed some light on the mechanics of how changes can take place within the systems.  The 
configuration and evolution of systems are today often studied under the theoretical headings of 
"regulatory competition"
4 and analyses of "system convergence".
5  A detailed description of the 
systems and their components might be useful for these topics in a way that resembles the utility of 
micro-market structure analyses to the study of how information affects prices in a securities market.
6  
It may allow some of the transfers of cause and effect within each system's components to be seen, 
rather than assumed. 
Part II of this paper will discuss the topical areas of law that are normally understood to fall 
within the company law governing public companies in the United States and Germany.  If different 
                                                   
4   "Regulatory competition" is a competition between regulators (such as jurisdictions issuing corporate law 
or securities exchanges) to attract entities to establish themselves under the rules controlled by such 
regulator.  On regulatory competition in Europe, see John Armour, "Who Should Make Corporate Law? 
EU Legislation versus Regulatory Competition," ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of 
Cambridge Working Paper No. 307 (June 2005); Martin Gelter, The Structure of Regulatory Competition 
in European Corporate Law, 5 JCLS 247 (2005); Tobias H. Tröger, Choice of Jurisdiction in European 
Corporate Law – Perspectives of European Corporate Governance, 6 EBOR 3 (2005), and Christian 
Kirchner, Richard Painter & Wulf Kaal, "Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art: 
Unbundling Delaware's Product for Europe," Law and Economics Working Paper Series Working Paper 
no. LE04-001 (Dec. 2004). On the United States, among the extremely voluminous literature,  see the 
recent papers by William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, "The Equilibrium Content of Corporate 
Federalism," European Corporate Governance Institute Law Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 
23/2004, and Roberta Romano, "The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for 
Corporate Charters," Yale University International Center for Finance (ICF) Working Paper No. 05-08 
(April 2005), as well as the classics  William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections on 
Delaware, 83 YALE L. J. 663 (1974); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 
(1985); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,  Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware 
Corporate Law,” 65 TEXAS L REV (1987), and Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: 
The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992). 
5   See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark Roe, Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, in: 
CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 69 (JEFFREY N. GORDON & MARK ROE, 
EDS. 2004). The essay was originally published in 52 STAN L. REV. 127 (1999); John C. Coffee, Jr., The 
Future as History: the Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications, 
93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 641 (1999), and Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance, Convergence of 
Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329 (2001). 
6   For example, instead of saying information X was released at time T and price moved from P1 to P2 by 
time T2 (assuming the transmission of causality), a "micro-market structure" analysis looks at how the 
mechanics of trading and the decisions of the persons involved react to information and pass on its effect.  
See Paul G. Mahoney, Market Microstructure and Market Efficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 541 (2003); and 
LARRY HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES: MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE FOR PRACTITIONERS (2003). The Laws Applicable to Corporations 
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mixes of topical laws govern the same area in different jurisdictions, a comparison that does not take 
this difference into account could be distorted.  For example, if we compared the German company 
law rule requiring disclosure of an interest in a stock corporation that exceeds 25 % of its capital, 
expressed in § 20(1) of the Aktiengesetz, exclusively with the DGCL and the case law related to that 
statute, which  states no such requirement, we would have to conclude that German company law 
creates greater transparency.  However, if we add to the mix a US federal law, the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"),
7 and the rule issued under it requiring disclosure of any holding 
exceeding 5 % of the capital of a "registered" company,
8 we tend to reach the opposite conclusion, and 
German law appears less extensive.  Yet when the requirements of  § 21 of the German Securities 
Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, or "WpHG") are also added to the comparison,
9 we see that the 
obligations of Delaware and German public companies are quite similar in this respect.  Because the 
rules governing companies may be differently distributed in different topical laws within different 
countries, knowledge of the applicable topical laws, including their nature and the range of their 
application, is necessary. 
Part III of this paper will describe the relationships between the various jurisdictions that enact 
the laws and issue the rules composing the "company law" governing corporations formed pursuant to 
the DGCL and the Aktiengesetz.  Knowledge of the influence of other jurisdictions, particularly when 
they have supremacy over or pre-empt the jurisdiction that promulgates the corporate law statute, is a 
necessary component in any understanding of the workings of the statute and the companies created 
according to its provisions.  Here, the relationships between the federal and state governments in the 
United States and  between  the E U  and member state governments  in the European Union  are 
described.  The initial and continued listing requirements of securities exchanges are relevant for both 
the United States and Germany. 
                                                   
7   Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78m(a) (2000).   
8   Rule 13d-1 under the Exchange Act requires that any person who acquires directly or indirectly more than 
5 % of either the "voting power" or the "investment power" of any class of equity security  registered 
under § 12 Exchange Act must file details on such acquisition (on a form called a "Schedule 13D") with 
the SEC within 10 days after the acquisition. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(a).  Securities must be registered 
under § 12 of the Exchange Act if either (i) they are listed on a national securities exchange (§ 12(a) 
Exchange Act) or (ii) the issuer of the securities has more than 500 shareholders and total assets 
exceeding $ 10 million (§ 12(g) Exchange Act in connection with Exchange Act Rule 12g-1, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.12g-1).  In addition to securities registered under § 12 Exchange Act, Rule 13d-1 also applies to 
"any equity security of any insurance company which would have been required to be so registered except 
for the exemption contained in section 12(g)(2)(G) of the Act, or any equity security issued by a closed-
end investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940." 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-
1(i). 
9   § 21(1) of the Securities Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz) published on September 9, 1998 (Federal 
Law Reporter I p. 2708), as last amended by Article 1 of the Investor Protection Improvement Act of 
October 28, 2004 (Federal Law Reporter I p. 2630), requires that any person who through acquisition, 
disposal, or in another manner reaches, exceeds or falls below one of the thresholds of 5 per cent, 10 per 
cent, 25 per cent, 50 per cent or 75 per cent of the voting rights of a listed company must within seven 
calendar days provide written notice of this to Federal Agency for the Supervision of Financial Services. The Laws Applicable to Corporations 
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The  jurisdictional  relationships show interesting differences in  the United States and  the 
European Union.  For example, German companies are required to provide the public with access to 
their annual financial statements by filing them with the commercial register.
10 The presence of this 
requirement in German company law is a result of the way that EU law interacts with the laws of the 
EU member states.  EU company law
11 has been enacted primarily through directives,
12 which must be 
implemented through national law.
13  The requirement that companies disclose annual accounts was 
included in Article 2 of the First Company Law Directive, which was issued in 1968.
14  Germany 
                                                   
10   This required disclosure was previously specified in §§ 177 and 178 AktG, but has since been moved for 
housekeeping purposes into §§ 325-329 of the Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch) together with other 
disclosure duties of stock corporations.  See UWE HÜFFER, AKTIENGESETZ 847 (6
th ed. 2004) and GÜNTER 
HENN, HANDBUCH DES AKTIENRECHTS 589 (7
th ed. 2002). 
11   There is a certain lack of clarity on whether to refer to directives as "EU" or "EC" law.  As Prof. Eilís 
Ferran explains with reference to the directives adopted in the area of securities regulation, "[t]he strict 
technical position is that securities laws are made within the legal framework of the European Community 
(EC, formerly European Economic Community or EEC), which is  a Community within the common 
structure of the European Union.  The EU, as such, has a limited role." EILÍS FERRAN, BUILDING AN EU 
SECURITIES MARKET 7 (2004). The same applies to the company law directives.  However, as Prof. Ferran 
explains, it is common in practice to refer to these directives as "EU" law since the European Community 
is an integral part ("Pillar I") of the European Union, and she follows this practice unless technical 
accuracy demands otherwise.  For the same reasons, this paper also refers to company law directives and 
regulations as "EU law" except where discussing the nature of the Community's legislative powers vis-à-
vis the EU member states. 
12   A "directive" is an instrument proposed by the European Commission and issued by the European 
Council with the consultation or approval or notification of the European Parliament, and that is "binding, 
as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the 
national authorities the choice of form  and methods." Art. 249, Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, Dec. 24, 2002, O.J. 33 (C 325) (2002), (EC Treaty). See PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, 
EU LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 112-115 (3
rd ed. 2003).  EU company law has been harmonized 
almost exclusively through directives enacted under Article 44(2)(g) of the EC Treaty, which provides 
that, "[i]n order to attain freedom of establishment . . . the Council . . . shall act by means of directives . . .  
coordinating to the necessary extent the safeguards . . . required by Member States of companies . . . with 
a view to making such safeguards equivalent throughout the Community."  See VANESSA EDWARDS, EC 
COMPANY LAW 3-14 (1999) and STEFAN GRUNDMANN, EUROPÄISCHES GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 48, 69-72 
(2004).  Articles 43-48 of the EC Treaty guarantee freedom of establishment, and thus "require the 
removal of restrictions on the right of individuals and companies to maintain a permanent or settled place 
of business in a Member State."   CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 12, at 765. 
13   The two notable exceptions to this use of directives in EU company law arose in the creation of 
organizational forms directly under EU law. The first was the supranational partnership, the European 
Economic Interest Grouping, which was created in 1985 with a regulation (Council Regulation 2137/85 of 
25 July 1985 on the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG) 1985 O.J. (L 199) 1) and the second 
was a supranational company form, the Societas Europae, which was created effective 2004 with both a 
regulation (Council Regulation 2157/2001, of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European company 
(SE) 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1) and a directive (Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001 
supplementing the Statute for a European company with regard to the involvement of employees 2001 
O.J. (L 294) 22).  A "regulation" is "binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States." 
Art. 249 EC Treaty. 
14   First Council Directive (68/151/EEC) of 9 March 1968 on co-ordination of safeguards which, for the 
protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the 
meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, with a view to making such safeguards 
equivalent throughout the Community, 1968 O.J. (L 65) 8; see also a consolidated version as amended 
thorough January 1, 1995, available at www.eurlex.eu. The Laws Applicable to Corporations 
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implemented the First Company Law Directive in 1969.
15  Thus, the same EU law requirement will be 
found in a substantially similar form in the various company laws of the EU member states, because 
national legislatures must comply with an obligation to implement the supranational directive.
16  US 
federal law does not, and indeed cannot, issue direct instructions to a state legislature to enact a 
particular type of law.
17  This means that US federal laws, such as the Exchange Act, operate on a 
plane separate from that occupied by the state company law statutes.  These two parallel systems 
manoeuvre around each other, and at times leave gaps or collide.  An instruction to implement as used 
in the European Union is, however, found in other forms in the United States, such as the recent 
federal law instructions – via the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) – to the national 
securities exchanges to issue  listing rules requiring audit committees composed of independent 
directors.
18  The relationship  also exists on a private, voluntary basis in the manner  that centrally 
formulated changes to the Model Business Corporation Act (referred to here as the "Model Act") are 
then voluntarily implemented in the laws of the various states that have based their corporate statutes 
on the Model Act.
19  It is necessary to understand the relationships between the jurisdictions that adopt 
or propose company law provisions in or for a given jurisdiction to understand the particular structure, 
content and historical development of such law. 
Part IV will offer some observations based on the description of company law structure laid out 
in Parts II and III.  It will evaluate what the composition of company law and the dynamics of the 
jurisdictions that create it in the United States and the European Union can tell us about regulatory 
competition and the international convergence of company laws. 
                                                   
15   See The Law Implementing the First Directive of the European Council on the Coordination of Company 
Law (Gesetz zur Durchführung der Ersten Richtlinie des Rates der Europäischen Gemeinschaften zur 
Koordinierung des Gesellschaftsrecht) of August 15, 1969, Federal Law Reporter, vol. I, p. 1146. 
16   See, e.g., s 242 Companies Act 1985 for the duty under UK law to deposit annual accounts with the 
registrar of companies for England and Wales. 
17   As the US Supreme Court explained in 1997: "The Federal Government may neither issue directives 
requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their 
political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program."  Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898, 932; 117 S.Ct. 2365, 2384 (1997). 
18   See § 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, which requires the 
SEC to issue rules directing national securities exchanges to prohibit the listing of an issuer unless each 
member of the audit committee of such issuer is a member of the board of directors of the issuer and 
meets specified criteria for independence.  The SEC issued its directions through rules in its release, Final 
Rule: Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, SEC Release Nos. 33–8220; 34–47654, 
68 Fed. Reg. 18788 (Apr. 16, 2003).  The requirement is now found, for example, in Section 303 of the 
New York Stock Exchange's LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, available in a continuously updated form at 
www.nyse.com. 
19   The Model Act is drafted by the Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association. The process 
of updating and adopting the Model Act will be discussed in more detail in Part III.A.2.  The Model Act 
has been adopted in substance in 35 of the 50 US states.  See Richard A. Booth, A Chronology of the 
Evolution of the MBCA, 56 BUS. LAW. 63, 66 (2000). The Laws Applicable to Corporations 
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II. The Topical Areas of Law Included in Company Law 
A. In the Abstract 
Company or corporate law in all jurisdictions is generally understood to enable the creation of 
an entity  with "five core structural characteristics": "(1) legal personality, (2) limited liability, (3) 
transferable shares, (4) centralized management under a board structure, and (5) shared ownership by 
contributors of capital."
20  If a law other than a "company" law were to regulate one of these "core 
characteristics" of the corporate entity, it would likely require treatment in a study of company law.  
This is unproblematic when another law is expressly linked to the company law.  A classic case is 
labor codetermination in Germany.  The sections of the  Aktiengesetz that refer to number, 
qualifications and appointment of members of the supervisory board expressly refer to the provisions 
of the various laws providing for codetermination in Germany.
21  The inclusion of codetermination 
laws in any study of German company law is thus beyond question.  Difficulties arise, however, when 
certain laws may be necessary to understand the regulation of a corporation in a given country, but are 
not expressly linked to the company law.  If such laws are excluded from treatment, an attempt to 
understand the system of regulation will be incomplete.  Thus, for example, to the extent that laws 
other than company law regulate the public offering of shares in corporations, such laws are necessary 
to understand the "core" activity of share transfers and would have to be included within any 
competent treatment of company law.  Likewise, if the initial and continued listing standards of a stock 
exchange regulate the nature of and rights embodied in shares, the disclosure of information or the 
                                                   
20   REINIER R. K RAAKMAN, P AUL DAVIES, H ENRY HANSMANN, G ÉRARD HERTIG, K LAUS J. H OPT, H IDEKI 
KANDA, AND EDWARD B. ROCK, THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH  5  (2004).  These characteristics are no  recent invention.  For similar lists of core 
characteristics, at least with respect to US law, see ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 2 (1986) and 
HENRY W. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 1 (1946).  For an historical discussion of the 
development of these characteristics, see Paul G. Mahoney, Contract or Concession? An Essay on the 
History of Corporate Law, 34 Ga. L. Rev. 873 (2000) (focusing on legal personality and limited liability); 
Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors, 33 
HOFSTRA L. R EV. 89 (2004) (focusing on central management under a board), and Ron Harris, "The 
Formation of the East India Company as a Deal between Entrepreneurs and Outside," Working Paper, 
Boalt Hall School of Law, UC Berkeley (July 2004) (discussing the early operation of shareholders 
meetings in the owner/investor governance of the company). 
21   See §§ 95–104 AktG.  Codetermination in German companies is regulated by three major laws, one of 
which – the Law on Co-Determination of Employees in the Supervisory Boards and Management Boards 
of Enterprises Engaged in the Mining Iron and Steel Industries of 21 May 1951 ( Montan-
Mitbestimmungsgesetz) – is no longer relevant. The most important law today is the Co-Determination 
Act o f 1976 (Mitbestimmungsgesetz, or "MitbestG"), which applies to all limited liability companies 
(Gesellschaft mit beschrankten Haftung or "GmbH") and AGs with more than 2,000 employees (see § 1 
MitbestG), and requires that one-half of the supervisory board comprise representatives of the employees 
and their unions (see § 7 MitbestG).  See Bernt Gach, Gesetz über die Mitbestimmung der Arbeiter, in 
MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR AKTIENGESETZ Vol 3, 1301 (Bruno Kropff & Johannes Semler, ed., 2004).  
Another important piece of legislation, the Works Constitution Act of 1952 (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz), 
requires that a company have a supervisory board and that one-third of the board members be appointed 
by employees if the corporation employs more than 500 persons. The Laws Applicable to Corporations 
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composition and operation of the board, such rules would also need to be included  – unless listed 
companies are to be excluded from treatment.   
Each of the five "core" characteristics listed above may, moreover, be closely tied to other areas 
of law.  One purpose of legal personality and limited liability is to demarcate the assets to which 
creditors may take recourse in collecting debts of the corporation,
22 and this position is integrally tied 
to the rights creditors hold in insolvency proceedings over the company's assets.  The inclusion of 
bankruptcy law in the study of company law is, however, still debated.  Professors Henry Hansmann 
and Reinier Kraakman would – with the exception of the doctrine of wrongful dealing in insolvency – 
exclude bankruptcy law from a treatment of company law because "the problems of  bankruptcy 
presented by corporations are often shared by other types of legal entities."
23  This test looks to the 
legislative purpose and reach of the law in question:  "bodies of law designed to serve objectives that 
are largely unrelated to the core characteristics of the corporate form . . . do not fall within the scope of 
corporate law."
24  A law designed to serve broad objectives and apply to a number of entities other 
than corporations should, accordingly, not be included within a study of corporate law.  However, it is 
questionable whether the best test is to focus on the intent and design of the topical law considered for 
inclusion, or rather to examine the importance of such law for an understanding of how a corporation's 
core characteristics are regulated in the jurisdiction.  German labor laws aim to assure fair working 
conditions for employees and include corporate representation as one means, US securities laws aim to 
protect investors and do so by imposing disclosure requirements on the offer and sale of securities 
regardless of who sells them or whether the securities are issued by a corporation.  The principles of 
agency law that are central to any discussion of corporate governance were not devised to regulate 
centralized management under a board. 
It would appear that the test actually used when evaluating inclusion is whether a given law or 
set of rules in essential to understand the governance of the corporation in the country studied.  For 
example, in a recent paper addressing regulatory competition in Europe, Prof. John Armour explores 
whether member states could successfully use their bankruptcy laws to control the flow of regulatory 
competition opened by recent decisions of the European Court of Justice.  He argues convincingly that 
"[c]orporate insolvency law supplies rules which govern companies experiencing financial distress, 
and so it is appropriate to consider it as being within the scope of a functional account of 'company 
law'.  In particular, there may be complementarities between insolvency law and other aspects of a 
                                                   
22   KRAAKMAN et al., supra note 20, at 9, and ." Henry Hansman & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of 
Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 393 (2000). 
23   KRAAKMAN et al., supra note 20, at 17. 
24   KRAAKMAN et al., supra note 20, at 17. The Laws Applicable to Corporations 
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country's corporate governance regime."
25  The term "complementarities" describes relationships 
within a given legal system, where one element of the system works together with another, producing 
a consistent legal framework  – the elements complement one another as the term would be used in 
aesthetics.
26  Thus, if "complementarities" exist between aspects of a corporate law statute and 
provisions of a law in another topical field, such provisions would play a role in the overall function of 
corporate law that could not be ignored when deciding whether to incorporate in that jurisdiction.  
That is, an entrepreneur could not reasonably exclude such provisions from consideration when 
evaluating the way in which the five core characteristics of a corporation function in such jurisdiction.  
This "effects" test would demand that provisions of separate law be considered together with the 
jurisdiction's company law  – regardless of whether the legislative purpose of such law focuses  on 
corporations – if they "complement" or provide a necessary supplement to the corporate law statute.  
Professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman seem to acknowledge as much when they include 
tort law within their discussion of corporate limited liability.
27   
The following graphic shows how certain topical laws work to complement and qualify the 
manner in which the five, core characteristics of a stock corporation work in practice. 
 
FIGURE 1: THE FIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF A CORPORATION AND RELATED TOPICAL LAWS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If the test used when evaluating a topical law for inclusion in a study of company law is the 
necessity of such topical law for a complete understanding of company law in a given jurisdiction, the 
topical laws drawn into company law studies could vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and 
depending on the breadth of the analysis.  Certain topical laws might be brought into the picture as 
                                                   
25   Armour, supra note 4, at 38. 
26   See Reinhard H. Schmidt & Gerald Spindler,  Path dependence and complementarity in corporate 
governance, in Gordon & Roe, supra note 3, at 114. 
27   KRAAKMAN et al., supra note 20, at 17. 
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functional counterparts to provisions of the company law of another country in the comparison: to use 
the example employed above, we draw securities regulation into our comparison of German and 
Delaware law to show that a corporation formed under the DGCL is subject to "company law" that 
also includes requirements to disclose equity holdings in corporations b ecause of the applicable 
provisions of the Exchange Act.  Indeed, if the Exchange Act did not exist, the legislature or courts of 
Delaware might have acted to require such disclosure under the DGCL, which makes its absence from 
the DGCL more an historical-cultural accident than necessity.  When adjustments through the 
inclusion of topical laws are not made, the laws of a given jurisdiction might be incorrectly 
condemned as faulty or incomplete.  
B. In Germany 
The provisions of the  Aktiengesetz  provide a comprehensive regulation of stock corporations 
and most may not be waived or altered by the shareholders in a charter of a specific company.  
Tracking the core characteristics referred to above, the  Aktiengesetz provides for the creation of an 
entity with  legal personality, limited liability and transferable shares ( see  §§ 1-53a AktG), with a 
centralized management under a two-tier board structure (see  §§ 76-116 AktG)
28 that is subject in 
certain respects to the shareholders (see §§ 118-147).  As said, the Aktiengesetz is mainly mandatory, 
and thus the company's charter may deviate from the letter of the law only where the law expressly so 
provides.
29  The  Aktiengesetz  also incorporates by reference provisions of the Commercial Code 
(Handelsgesetzbuch) on the preparation of the annual financial statements, including the specification 
of reserves and distributable profits (§ 150 AktG), provides a right to demand a special audit (§§ 142-
146), and requires the financial statements to be made available to the shareholders for their approval 
(§ 175 AktG).  Going well beyond the range of coverage that would be expected by an American 
lawyer, the Aktiengesetz contains provisions on the disclosure of equity holdings (§ 20 AktG), for the 
solicitation of proxies by banks holding shares in custody (§ 128 AktG), incorporates the Co-
determination Act to place labor representatives on the supervisory board (§ 101 AktG), specifies the 
rights, duties and required financial statements of companies operating in corporate groups (§§ 291-
328 AktG), and requires listed companies to adopt a governance code on a "comply or explain" basis 
(§ 161 AktG).  As will be discussed in Part III, many of these special provisions originate in EU 
                                                   
28   Under the Aktiengesetz, a stock corporation has a two-tier board.   The two levels are the supervisory 
board (Aufsichtsrat), provided for in §§ 95-116 AktG, and the management board (Vorstand), provided 
for in §§ 76-94 AktG).  The shareholders elect all or some (if co-determination applies) of the supervisory 
directors (§ 101(1) AktG), and the supervisory board in turn appoints the managing directors (§ 84(1) 
AktG), who have direct responsibility for managing the company (§ 76(1) AktG).  For discussions of this 
structure,  see  Theodore Baums, "Company Law Reform in  Germany," Johann Wolfgang Goethe-
Universität, Institute for Banking Law, Working Paper No. 100 (2002), available at http://www.jura.uni-
frankfurt.de/baums/, and Klaus Hopt, The German Two-Tier Board (Aufsichtsrat): A German View on 
Corporate Governance, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 3 (Klaus Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch, 
eds., 1997).   
29   § 23(5) AktG, discussed in detail in Part III.B.3. The Laws Applicable to Corporations 
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directives that were incorporated into the Aktiengesetz over the years.  Regardless of its jurisdictional 
origin, however, the resulting law is broad, comprehensive and mandatory.  German courts have also 
filled gaps in statutory law by imposing a significant body of doctrine on such areas as equitable 
subordination of loans made by shareholders to the company and fiduciary duties of management.
30  
One exception to the inclusive tendency of the  Aktiengesetz is the "outsourcing" of the rules on 
mergers between stock corporations to a special law, the "Transformation (or Reorganization) Act" 
(Umwandlungsgesetz).
31 
Although the Aktiengesetz itself includes provisions that an American lawyer would attribute to 
areas outside of corporate law proper  – such as on the disclosure of holdings, the preparation of 
financial statements and the behavior of custodian banks in the proxy solicitation process  – most 
studies of German company law would also include a number of rules from the topical area "capital 
markets law" or "securities regulation" in any comprehensive treatment o f company law proper, 
especially when discussing listed companies.
32  Thus, the complete picture of what we understand as 
"company law" in Germany is rather broad. 
C. In Delaware 
Although each of the 50 US states have their own corporate law statute, by far the largest 
portion of major US corporations, including more than half of the publicly listed companies, are 
incorporated under the law of the State of Delaware.
33  As will be discussed at more length in Part III, 
this is possible because U.S. law generally holds that the existence and "internal affairs" of a 
corporation are governed by the place of its incorporation,
34 and US states generally accept 
corporations incorporated in other states to do business in their state as "foreign" corporations subject 
to minimal requirements, such as designating an agent for service of process.
35  In the late 1890's a 
                                                   
30   See e.g., the High Federal Court's judicial creation of a German business judgment rule in ARAG v. 
Garmenbeck, BGHZ 135, 244 (1997). 
31   Umwandlungsgesetz (UmwG) of October 28, 1994, printed in the German Law Reporter (BGBl.), vol. I, 
p. 3210, last amended by the Contract Law Modernization Act of December 9, 2004, BGBl., vol. I, p. 
3214. 
32   See, e.g., Johannes Semler, Einleitung, in MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ 1, 6-7 (2
nd ed. 
2000) and KARSTEN SCHMIDT, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 32 (4
th ed 2002), including the Securities Trading 
Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz) in the "sources of company law."  
33   According to the Department of State, Division of Corporations, of the State of Delaware, as consulted in 
November 2004, "more than half a million business entities have their legal home in Delaware including 
more than 50% of all U.S. publicly-traded companies and 58% of the Fortune 500." This information is 
available at http://www.state.de.us/corp/default.shtml/, last visited on October 7, 2005. 
34   See EUGENE F. SCOLES et al., CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 23.2 (3
rd ed. 2000).  See Part III for a definition of 
what falls within the term "internal affairs." 
35   See  FRANKLIN  A. G EVURTZ, C ORPORATION  LAW 36 (2000).  Although states do not require local 
incorporation as a requisite for doing business, the US Supreme Court has held that such a request would 
not impermissibly burden the interstate commerce whose regulation lies solely within the jurisdiction of 
the federal government.  See Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 282 U.S. 440 (1931). The Laws Applicable to Corporations 
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number of states began to fashion their corporate laws to attract promoters planning to incorporate new 
companies and companies that might choose to reincorporate in a different state.
36  The State of 
Delaware joined this race after the future US president, Woodrow Wilson, who was then governor of 
the State of New Jersey, amended the New Jersey laws to accord with his socially progressive ideals, 
and has become the clear leader in this market.
37  
The DGCL provides for each of the five, core characteristics of a business corporation.  It 
provides for the creation of an entity with  legal personality (§§ 101-136 DGCL), limited liability 
(§ 102(b)(6) DGCL), management by a centralized board (§§ 141-146 DGCL) and transferable shares 
(§§ 201-202 DGCL).  The aspect of shared ownership by investors is implicit in the company's 
existence as an entity that must issue stock (§ 102(a)(4) DGCL), which must be paid for (§§ 152-16 
DGCL), and which represents a property interest in the corporation that may be classified as a "chose 
in action."
38  Although shareholders rarely use this power, § 141 DGCL gives shareholders the right to 
vest management in a body other than the board of directors, thus expressly vesting residual control 
with the owners of the corporation.
39   Indeed, perhaps the greatest difference between the DGCL and 
the Aktiengesetz (as statutes) is that the Delaware law functions to a great extent as a set of default 
terms that shareholders may modify or even eliminate in the company's certificate of incorporation.
40  
The result is a mixture of mandatory and optional rules. One element of Delaware law, which is not 
within the four corners of the DGCL, is, of course, the most obvious difference between the law of a 
Common Law jurisdiction like Delaware, and a Civil Law jurisdiction, like Germany:  the Common 
Law jurisdiction depends more heavily on  case law, which in Delaware law often means judicial 
decisions shaping fiduciary duties.
41 
                                                   
36   See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 4, at 15-20.  
37   See Part III.A.1 of this paper. 
38   See Equitable Trust Co. v. Gallagher, 67 A.2d 50, 54 (Del.Ch. 1949). 
39   Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a): "The . . . corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a 
board . . . except as may be provided otherwise in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation" 
(emphasis added). A similar provision is found in the Model Act. See RMBCA § 7.32(a): "An agreement 
among the shareholders . . . is effective . . . even though . . . it . . . eliminates the board of directors or 
restricts the discretion or powers of the board of directors." 
40   See Katharina Pistor, "Legal Ground Rules in Coordinated and Liberal Market Economies,"  Working 
Paper N° 30/2005, ECGI Working Paper Series in Law 9 (March 2005). 
41   For the two-year 1999 and 2000, Robert B. Thompson and Randall Thomas found that approximately 
78 % of Delaware Chancery Court cases addressed fiduciary duty issues.  See Robert B. Thompson, 
Delaware, the Feds, and the Stock Exchange: Challenges to the First State as First in Corporate Law, 29 
Del. J. Corp. L. 779, 785 (2004).   It should also be noted that the use of cases as weighty authority is one 
area in which Common Law and Civil Law are certainly on a convergence path in many European 
countries.  In conversations and experience during the period between 1992 and 2005, the author has 
received confirmation again and again that case precedent is the soundest authority used in Italy and 
Germany to discern the meaning of a given statutory provision. The Laws Applicable to Corporations 
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Returning to the contents of the statute itself, we see that the DGCL contains few of the "extras" 
found in the Aktiengesetz, such as disclosure, accounting and audit rules, or rules on the operation of 
corporate groups.  One exception to the generally true statement that the DGCL is a much thinner and 
less mandatory statute is that the DGCL provides rules for mergers (§§ 251-266 DGCL) and at least 
one provision on takeovers (§ 203 DGCL).  Given the thin and relatively optional character of the 
DGCL, it is not surprising that scholarly works on US corporate law inevitably include a healthy dose 
of securities regulation.
42  As will be discussed in more detail in Part III of this paper, including 
"securities regulation" means looking to the requirements of some or all of the federal laws grouped 
under Title 15 of the US Code, which includes the Exchange Act, the Securities Act of 1933 (the 
"Securities Act"),
43 and the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (the "Trust Indenture Act").
44  It is also 
common to include basic principles of revocable or fraudulent transfers from bankruptcy law in studies 
of US corporate law.
45  These serve to supplement the very permissive capital maintenance rules found 
in the DGCL and all other US company law statutes. 
The enabling nature of US statutes, which provide many non-mandatory "default" rules, has 
resulted in a relatively minimal statutory structure that has been filled in, as said, by court decisions 
imposing fiduciary duties and – usually following major events in which shareholders lose significant 
amounts of money – by the federal government stepping in to fill a public demand for action.
46  The 
structure of US company laws, and the DGCL in particular, thus invites a number of supplementing 
forces, which accounts for the manner in which it has developed.  In individual companies, it would 
have been possible that the articles of incorporation comprehensively provided for every imaginable 
right, duty and circumstance, leaving little that need to be addressed by other laws.  However, once an 
abuse did take place, a decision of the Delaware Supreme Court became the mandatory law for all 
companies incorporated in Delaware.  If the problem occurred on a scale wide enough to attract 
national attention, the US Congress would then supplement flexible corporate norms with mandatory 
provisions of securities laws or SEC rules designed to prevent abuse in circumstances of a given type. 
This supplementation of the DGCL by the case law of the Delaware courts and the US securities laws 
                                                   
42   See e.g., BALLANTINE, supra note 20, at 858-886; CLARK, supra note 20, at 293-340 and 719-749; and 
GEVURTZ, supra note 35, at 537-629 (2000). Gevurtz notes that "federal securities laws have become a 
significant component of corporation law." Id. at 39. 
43   The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A §§ 77a-77aa (2000).  
44   The Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C.A §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (2000). 
45   See  MELVIN  ARON  EISENBERG, C ORPORATIONS AND  OTHER  BUSINESS  ORGANIZATIONS: C ASES AND 
MATERIALS 859-860 (Concise 9
th ed. 2005), and  CLARK, supra note 20, at 40-52. Dean Clark also 
includes bankruptcy provisions on equitable subordination of creditor claims in his treatment of corporate 
law.  See Id., at 52-71. 
46   See Part III.A.1 for a discussion of this tendency. The Laws Applicable to Corporations 
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leads us to an analysis of the jurisdictional interaction that forms "company law" for Delaware 
corporations. 
III. Jurisdictions That Interact to Form Company Law 
A. The United States 
The jurisdictions
47 that create the rules governing public companies in the United States are the 
states (e.g., the State of Delaware enacted the DGCL),
48 the federal government (which enacted, e.g., 
the Exchange Act and the Securities Act) and the securities exchange on which a given company's 
shares are listed (e.g., the New York Stock Exchange and the Nasdaq Stock Market both issue their 
listing standards).
49  The character of the provisions enacted or issued by each of these jurisdictions 
should be understood in at least three ways:  
1. the areas that each jurisdiction's law or rules traditionally cover,  
2. the relationship between each jurisdiction, and  
3. whether the laws or rules are mandatory or optional in character.   
Figure 2 presents a summary graphic of these, three characteristics as applied to the three jurisdictions 
issuing rules for publicly listed companies in the United States.  These characteristics will be discussed 
in detail in the following paragraphs 1 through 3. 
FIGURE 2: THE JURISDICTIONAL BREAKDOWN OF RULES GOVERNING US CORPORATIONS 
 
 
     
 
 
 
                                                   
47   The word "jurisdiction" is used very loosely here in referring to securities exchanges.  The agreement 
between an issuer and the securities exchange on which its shares are listed is a contract, and the 
exchange has "regulatory" power only over a very narrow group of persons, particularly its members and 
participants and its listed companies. 
48   It should be noted that state law also includes securities laws (usually called "blue sky" laws), many of 
which were enacted before the Securities Act.  Such laws have become progressively less important as 
federal law has either expressly or tacitly pre-empted their application.  Two relatively recent laws, the 
National Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996 (the "NSMIA", Pub.L.No. 104-290, 112 Stat. 
3416) and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (the "SLUSA", Pub.L.No. 105-353, 
112 Stat. 3227) removed a significant amount of activity from the state jurisdictions.  See LOUIS LOSS & 
JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 28-30 and 1187-1192 (5
th ed. 2004). 
49   The initial and continued listing standards of the NYSE are set forth in the  NYSE L ISTED COMPANY 
MANUAL, supra note 18. The initial and continued listing standards of the Nasdaq Stock Market are set 
forth in the NASDAQ MARKETPLACE RULES (Rules 4000--7100), which are available in a continuously 
updated form at www.nasdaq.com. 
§ 19 Exchange Act 
State Law: Internal Affairs, Mix of Flexible and Mandatory, Subject to Federal Law
Supreme, but Deference to Internal Affairs
 
Federal Law 
Mainly Disclosure, Mandatory
Listing Rules: Affect All Aspects of Company, Primarily Mandatory, Contracts Subject to Federal and State Law The Laws Applicable to Corporations 
DRAFT: OCTOBER 2005 
 
 
- 14 - 
 
1. The areas each jurisdiction's laws or rules traditionally cover   
Part II explained how corporate law is generally considered to provide for the creation of an 
organization with five, core qualities, and that it should at times be understood to include other topical 
laws that supplement the base statute.  This primary realm of state corporate law has been roughly 
defined as the corporation's "internal affairs,"
50 although certain characteristics, such as limited 
liability, raise questions that strongly affect a company's dealing with third parties in the "external" 
world. Thus, state corporate law provides for the creation of an entity with legal personality and the 
management and representation of such entity in dealings with third parties.  Because liability is 
limited, state law imposes certain restrictions on distribution of corporate assets to the shareholders, 
although such restrictions have become less relevant in the United States over the years as protective 
measures shifted to  disclosure of the company's assets and financial condition  and contractual 
arrangements.
51  Because management is centralized, opportunities for management abuse are present, 
and thus state courts have developed a fine-tuned system of fiduciary duties to prevent corporate 
insiders from stealing the company's assets or shirking.
52  Because the company is owned by and 
ultimately responsible to owner-investors, statutes provide for shareholder participation in important 
decisions and periodic election of directors.  State corporation laws provided for these basic 
characteristics since the early 19
th century,
53 although such laws became significantly more flexible 
and began to take on the "enabling" character they currently display only at the turn of the century.
54 
                                                   
50   The concept of "internal affairs" comes from the area of conflicts of law.  R ESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
CONFLICTS OF LAW §302, Comment a (1971) defines "internal affairs" as referring to "the relations inter 
se  of the corporation, its shareholders, directors, officers or agents. . . . involv[ing] primarily a 
corporation's relationship to its shareholders [and] includ[ing] steps taken in the course of the original 
incorporation, the election or appointment of directors and officers, the adoption of by-laws, the issuance 
of corporate shares, preemptive rights, the holding of directors' and shareholders' meetings, methods of 
voting including any requirement for cumulative voting, shareholders' rights to examine corporate 
records, charter and by-law amendments, mergers, consolidations and reorganizations and the 
reclassification of shares. Matters which may also affect the interests of the corporation's creditors include 
the issuance of bonds, the declaration and payment of dividends, loans by the corporation to directors, 
officers and shareholders, and the purchase and redemption by the corporation of outstanding shares of its 
own stock."  
51   For a thorough discussion of US capital maintenance rules, see GEVURTZ, supra note 35, at 157-167. 
52   In the case of Delaware, it is thought that the courts' introduction of stricter fiduciary duties was a reaction 
to the critical stance taken by former SEC Chairman William Cary in 1974, when he accused the state of 
leading a "race to the bottom" (see Cary, supra note 4).  In a landmark decision of 1977, Singer v. 
Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), the Delaware Supreme Court imposed strict fiduciary duties on 
the management of a parent company in a cash out merger with a subsidiary.  See Bratton & McCahery, 
supra note 4, at 59-61. 
53   See Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 190-91 (2
nd ed. 1985); BALLANTINE, supra note 
20, at 37-38; Gevurtz, supra note 20, at 108, and WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS AND FINANCE 112-117 (9
th ed. 2004). 
54   This was a result of a well-documented process of regulatory competition led by New Jersey and 
successfully picked up by Delaware.  See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 4, at 15-20. See also Henry The Laws Applicable to Corporations 
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The federal government has traditionally refrained from entering the realm of corporate 
"internal affairs".
55  Congress has entered the field of company law only after economic and political 
shocks convinced a significant portion of the national population that the state law had failed t o 
prevent insiders from deceiving outside investors.
56  During the period of the great "trusts", such as 
Standard Oil, and their abuses that marked the end of the 19
th century, the federal government 
seriously considered replacing the state corporate statutes with federal law, but the project eventually 
lost momentum in light of more active antitrust prosecution.
57  After the stock market crash of 1929 
and the severe economic depression that followed, the federal government entered the securities field 
in force with the Securities Act,
58 the Exchange Act (which created the SEC), the Public Utility 
Holding Company Act of 1935,
59 the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the Investment Company Act of 
1940,
60 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
61  However, these laws and the extensive body of 
rules issued pursuant to them mostly require registration of companies, disclosure of financial and 
other information about the company and management, and make only minimal incursions into the 
internal affairs of the companies regulated.
62  When poor management and inefficient securities 
settlement procedures led to the collapse of over 100 major securities brokers in the late 1960's,
63 the 
federal government responded with the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970
64 and the 1975 
                                                                                                                                                               
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman,  The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 Geo. L.J. 439, 439-440 
(2001). 
55   See CTS Corporation v. Dynamics Corporation of America, 481 U.S. 69, 86; 107 S.Ct. 1637, 1648 (1987) 
(expressing respect for the "longstanding prevalence of state regulation in [the corporate law] area," while 
upholding a state takeover statute) and Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (refusing to 
apply the federal securities laws to matters of internal corporate management). 
56   See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 4, at 36-44. 
57   Bratton & McCahery, supra note 4, at 18-19 and Lawrence E. Mitchell, "The Creation of American 
Corporate Capitalism," The George Washington University Law School Public Law and Legal Theory 
Working Paper No. 104, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=586184. 
58   Probably the best account of this period is found in the first two chapters of  JOEL SELIGMAN, T HE 
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET (3
rd ed. 2003). 
59   The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 79-79z-6 (2000). 
60   The Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.A §§ 80a-1-80a-64 (2000). 
61   The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.A §§ 80b-1-80b-21 (2000). 
62   In the Exchange Act, incursions into the management of the corporation were limited to such 
requirements as disclosure of the shareholdings of managers and 10% stockholders, and the disgorgement 
of profits that such insiders made through short term dealings (within a period of six months) in the 
company's shares.  See § 16 Exchange Act.  An exception to the disclosure rule, the Investment Company 
Act, has always included a requirement that a specified percentage of independent or unaffiliated directors 
be seated on the board.  See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 (2000). 
63   For a thorough history on the "paper crunch" of the late 1960's, see CHRIS WELLES, THE LAST DAYS OF 
THE CLUB (1975). 
64   The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C.A §§ 78aaa-78lll (2000).  For a discussion of 
this legislation, see NORMAN S. POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION § 18.03 (3
rd ed. 2003). The Laws Applicable to Corporations 
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Securities Acts Amendments,
65 which introduced a form of deposit insurance for investors and gave 
the SEC complete power to change, add or abrogate securities exchange rules.
66 In 2002, following the 
revelation of serious accounting misrepresentations by major corporations such as Enron and 
WorldCom, and the collapse of the stock markets, the federal government enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 (SOA).
67  The SOA sought to reinforce the exiting system of disclosure by decreasing 
conflicts of interest, increasing accountability, and improving disclosures.  Conflicts of interest were 
reduced by strictly controlling the services that auditors (who have a gatekeeper function in 
disclosure)
68 could provide to the companies they audit,
69 by inserting an audit committee composed of 
independent directors into the boards of listed companies,
70 and by flatly outlawing company loans to 
directors.
71  These were certainly incursions into the internal affairs of the regulated companies, but 
were incursions related to the overall disclosure system.
72  Disclosures were improved by requiring 
inclusion of matters and notification of techniques that had been used to distort disclosed financial 
information, such as off-balance sheet transactions and pro-forma results.
73  Accountability was 
increased by requiring chief operating officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs) to 
personally sign required disclosures and attest to the accuracy and completeness of their contents 
subject to civil and criminal liability.
74  Thus, the subject matter of federal law has been primarily 
disclosure, imposed in reaction to political pressure arising in the wake of major scandals and market 
shocks.   
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also provided for the creation of a Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board, existing under the supervision of the SEC,
75 to establish and adopt accounting 
standards, which makes such standards substantially federal in nature.  It should also be noted that 
bankruptcy law, which we discussed in Part II as existing on the borders of company law in the United 
                                                   
65   P.L. 94-29, 89 stat. 97. 
66   See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 48, at 777-779. 
67   The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (SOA). For a good description of 
the causes leading up to the enactment of this legislation,  see  Charles Robert Clark, "Corporate 
Governance Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policymakers Too," 
Harvard, John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Discussion Paper No. 525 (Sept. 2004), 
available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/.  
68   See the excellent explanation of this function in John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The 
Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301 (2004). 
69   §§ 201-202 SOA. 
70   § 301 SOA. 
71   § 402 SOA. 
72   See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 4, at 56. 
73   § 401 SOA. 
74   §§ 302 and 904 SOA. 
75   § 101 SOA. The Laws Applicable to Corporations 
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States, is federal law.
76  After taking into account all of these federal elements, the degree of federal 
incursion in state company law is still slight when compared to the degree that EU law has shaped the 
company laws of the m ember states, discussed in Part III.B.  Aside from bankruptcy laws and 
accounting standards, the US state/federal divide in corporate law may still be understood as one 
between substantive rights from the states and disclosure required by the federal government. 
The initial and continued listing requirements of securities exchanges long preceded the 
enactment of federal rules,
77 and cover a broad range of matters, ranging from the "internal" 
composition of a company's board to the "external" provision of information to the public, to minimum 
requirements for total assets and the required public dispersion of the company's shares.
78  These 
requirements are contractual conditions to a company's listing on a given exchange, and a serious 
violation of these conditions can lead to a company being expelled from the market through 
involuntary de-listing.
79  Listing standards impose economic requirements (such as minimum 
aggregate market value and earnings),
80 share structure requirements (such as minimum public float),
81 
and corporate governance requirements (such as a board containing certain committees and a 
percentage of directors that meet specified independence requirements).
82  Because of differences in 
national legal systems, US securities exchanges have traditionally waived most "internal" corporate 
governance requirements for foreign companies, although this changed somewhat after the market 
collapse of 2002.
83  Aside from this partial waiver for companies formed under non-US law, initial and 
continuing listing requirements thus tend to be pervasive and mandatory. 
                                                   
76   Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (2000). 
77   See John C. Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation 
of Ownership and Control,  111  YALE  L.J. 1, 34-39 (2001) (giving a comparative analysis of the 
shareholder protection provided by the securities exchanges and describing their function in the history of 
shareholder protection), and Robert B. Thompson,  Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing 
Standards, State Law and Federal Regulation, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 961, 972 (2003) (noting that 
NYSE rules against watered stock had been in force for members since 1869). 
78   See NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 18, at Sections 1-4. For one of the best (non-proprietary) 
descriptions available of the listing process and requirements for a foreign company, see Michael Gruson, 
Andrew B. Jánszky, Jonathan M. Weld, Issuance and Listing of Securities by Foreign Banks and the U.S. 
Securities Laws, in REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS (Michael Gruson & Ralph Reisner, eds. 4
th ed. 
2005). 
79   Id. at Section 8. 
80   See Id. at Sections 101.01B and 101.01C.  
81   See Id. at Section 101.01A. 
82   See Id. at Sections 303A.01-07. 
83   See Id. at Section 303A.11.  For most rules affecting the governance structure of a company, foreign 
private issuers need only disclose, in a non-itemized manner, the significant ways in which their corporate 
governance practices differ from those required by the NYSE listing standards.  However, certain of the 
requirements, such as the audit committee specified in § 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is applicable also 
to foreign companies. The Laws Applicable to Corporations 
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2. The relationship of the jurisdictions to each other  
Federal to state.  In the area of company law, the relationship between the federal government 
and the states may be summarily characterized as one in which the former has power to supplant the 
latter, but has traditionally not done so.
84  Pursuant to Article VI, clause 2, of the U.S. Constitution, 
known as the "supremacy clause", the laws of the federal government preempt the laws of a state.
85  
Preemption is not uniformly present in all cases.  One might think of the federal preemption power as 
running on a sliding scale beginning with those cases where exclusive powers of the federal 
government are specified in the Constitution, and gradually decreasing through cases in which the 
Supreme Court has found there is a presumption in favor of preemption, to where the legal position is 
neutral, to cases where there is a presumption against preemption, and finishing with those cases in 
which the states have a constitutional immunity from preemption.
86  Because the Constitution vests the 
federal Congress with the power to regulate commerce among the states, known as the "commerce 
clause",
87 interstate commercial activity is a field where the argument for preemption is at its 
strongest.
88  Congress based its enactment of the various securities laws listed above on the commerce 
clause,
89 and there is little doubt that Congress could replace the various state corporate laws with a 
federal statute.
90 
As explained in section 1, because the US Congress may not – unlike the European Union –
command the states to implement specified policies, federal law and state law occupy separate realms.  
Although the federal government could supplant state corporate law, this has not been s eriously 
considered since the beginning of the 20
th century,
91 and in the mean time a "tradition" has developed 
according to which corporations are understood as "creatures of the state,"
92 and corporate law is 
                                                   
84   Bratton & McCahery, supra note 4, at 11. 
85   U.S. Const. Art. VI, clause 2.  For an informative historical analysis of the US federalist structure, see 
Michael W. McConnell, Federalism:  Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484 (1987). 
86   This sliding scale analysis is borrowed from Prof. Mark V. Tushnet, who uses it in a discussion of the 
foreign policy area, with the caveat that the five-point scale is "sufficient" for "the present purposes," 
which of course indicates that finer distinctions might be appropriate in different circumstances.  See 
Mark V. Tushnet, Globalization and Federalism in a Post-Printz World, 36 TULSA L.J. 11, 19 (2000). 
87   U.S. Const. Art. VI, Section 8, clause 3.  
88   See Prof. Tushnet's discussion of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), Tushnet, supra note 86, 
at 19-20. 
89   See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 48, at 98-101. 
90   See e.g., Bratton & McCahery, supra note 4, at 11; Joel Seligman, A Modest Revolution in Corporate 
Governance, 80 NOTRE DAME L. R EV. 1159, 1169 (2005); and Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, "Our 
Corporate Federalism and the Shape of Corporate Law," University of Pennsylvania Law School, Institute 
for Law and Economics, Research Paper No. 04-12 (June 2004). 
91   See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 4, and Mitchell, supra note 57. 
92   Green, 430 U.S. at 497. The Laws Applicable to Corporations 
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understood as an area in which there is a "longstanding prevalence of state regulation."
93 Thus, "except 
where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stock holders, 
state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation."
94 States are thus understood to have 
"broad latitude" in regulating the "internal affairs" of corporations.
95  The controversies in this area 
thus arise because of uncertainty as to whether a state law has entered a field preempted by federal 
law,
96 or whether a federal law remedy should be applied to an action (such as a "short-form" merger) 
that is considered "internal" and does not exhibit the characteristics (such as misrepresentation or 
fraud) that the federal law was enacted to combat,
97 or whether the SEC has overstepped its authority 
und the Exchange Act in regulating an "internal" matter (such as the voting rights embodied in shares) 
that is usually provided for in state corporate laws.
98  No legal controversy arises when the federal 
government expressly enters internal corporate affairs, as it did with §§ 301 and 402 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, although commentators may certainly wonder whether the intrusion was wise.
99 
European-style harmonization has taken place to a certain extent on a voluntary basis by some 
states substantially a dopting the Model Business Corporation Act drafted by the American Bar 
Association's Section of Business Law.  This ABA Committee continuously updates and improves the 
Model Act, and publishes drafts for discussion in the ABA publication, The Business Lawyer.  State 
legislatures are free to adopt the provisions with or without change.  In 2000, it was reported that 35 
states had substantially adopted the Model Act.
100  As a result, corporate law in the United States may 
be seen as divided into three, relatively harmonized camps: the majority of the states follow the Model 
Act, Delaware and a few states, such as Oklahoma, that follow the DGCL, and some large states like 
California and New York, which can afford to draft their own statutes from scratch and choose to 
                                                   
93   CTS, 481 U.S. at 86. 
94   Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975). 
95   Id., citing the decision of the Appeals Court's decision in the same case, Dynamics Corp. of America v. 
CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 264 (7
th Cir. 1986). 
96   See Edgar, 457 U.S. 624 (invalidating a state statute that imposed a waiting period of the consummation 
of takeover offers that was deemed to frustrate the balance achieved in the § 14 of the Exchange Act).  On 
the question of "field preemption" as applied to corporate and securities law,  see Roberta S. Karmel, 
"Reconciling Federal and State Interests in Securities Regulation in the United States and  Europe," 3-10 
(2002]), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=343621. 
97   Green, 430 U.S. 462 (The court found that, absent an allegation of misrepresentation or fraud – which are 
the key elements of Rule 10b-5 under the Exchange Act – the federal rule could not be used to invalidate 
a merger effected properly under state law.) 
98   See The Business Roundtable v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 905 F.2d 406 (1990). (The court 
found that the SEC's attempt to guarantee that all listed stock carried proportion al voting rights exceeded 
the agency's authority under § 14 of the Exchange Act.) 
99   See Thompson, supra note 41, at 797-798. 
100   See Booth, supra note 19. The Laws Applicable to Corporations 
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follow neither Delaware nor the Model Act.
101  A process that is comparable to the preparation and 
adoption of the Model Act occurs for rules on fraudulent conveyances.
102 
State to state. The relationships among the US states in the area of company law offer 
interesting opportunities for comparison with similar relationships in the European Union.  Because 
US state law in this area exists in the shadow of federal power to regulate interstate commerce, the 
states in their dealings with each other may not enter an area preempted by federal law or unduly 
impede interstate activity.
103  Courts have sought a balance between a state's reserved and traditional 
powers to police business within its borders and its obligations under the Constitution.  This tension 
arises in the problem of "foreign" and "pseudo-foreign" corporations.  The term "foreign corporation" 
is used to denote a company established and existing under the laws of a jurisdiction, whether that of a 
foreign country or another state of the United States, other than the state in which it is doing 
business.
104  Although the term "pseudo-foreign" corporation is not found in statutes, it is used to 
designate a corporation that although incorporated elsewhere, has most of its shareholders and 
business activity in the host state.  Most states require merely that a foreign corporation register with 
the state and provide an in-state agent who can be served with process papers if a judicial action is 
filed against the foreign corporation.
105 Some states, however, apply significant parts of their own 
corporate statutes to pseudo-foreign corporations.  For example, California applies rules regarding the 
election of directors (including by cumulative voting), their duties, and the participation of 
shareholders in the company to any corporation that is not listed on a national stock exchange if over 
half of its shareholders of record have California addresses and the company's payroll is mainly paid in 
the state.
106  New York requires the same type (i.e., unlisted, heavy operations in the state) of foreign 
corporations to provide information to shareholders and applies New York law to actions against and 
liability of company directors.
107 
                                                   
101   See JONATHAN R. MACEY, MACEY ON CORPORATION LAW (2002), for a discussion of the states that have 
followed a specific provision of the DGCL or the Model Act. 
102   The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, which was drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Law (NCCUSL) in 1984, revised a Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act that had 
existed since 1918.  The 1984 version has been adopted by 42 states and proposed by two others. See the 
NCCUSL website, at  http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ufta.asp, last 
consulted on October 23, 2005. 
103   See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 102 S.Ct. 2629 (1982), and Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 
137, 90 S.Ct. 844 (1970). 
104   See e.g., § 371(a) DGCL and § 1.40(10) RMBCA. 
105   See e.g., § 371(b) DGCL and § 15.03(a) RMBCA. 
106   § 2115 California Corporations Code. 
107   §§ 1315-1320 New York Business Corporation Law. The Laws Applicable to Corporations 
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The power that states have to impose such requirements on corporations formed under the law 
of another state has not been clearly defined,
108 but is considered to be extensive. A state may 
completely ban foreign corporations from operating within state territory,
109 but may not deprive such 
corporations of their constitutional rights or interfere with interstate commerce (thus foreign 
corporations retain the right to move through state territory).
110  There is no authoritative federal court 
decision on whether a state may regulate the internal affairs of a corporation in the manner done by the 
laws of California and New York, although there has been considerable speculation on the matter.
111  
Aside from a finding that such statutes interfere with interstate commerce or are preempted by an 
expanding federal regulation of corporations,
112 there is little constitutional basis for challenging the 
statutes.  First, a principal constitutional tool for guaranteeing the citizens of one state certain freedoms 
and rights in another state, the "privileges and immunities clause" of the US Constitution,
113 has been 
held not to apply to corporations.
114  Second, no federal decision has authoritatively applied another 
potentially applicable constitutional provision, the "full faith and credit clause,"
115 to guarantee that the 
structure of internal affairs governance of a corporation created in one state be respected in such form 
in another state.
116  It is important for this question that pseudo-foreign corporation laws of the type 
used in California have already existed without significant challenge for about 50 years, making it 
unlikely that they would be struck down on any ground other than federal preemption – if federal rules 
                                                   
108   See remarks of Prof. John C. Coffee, Jr., in John C. Coffee, Jr., et al. Symposium: The Direction of 
Corporate Law: The Scholar's Perspective, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 103 (1999). 
109   See 17 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORP. Foreign Corporations § 8386 (2005), and 36 AM. JUR. 
2
D FOREIGN CORPORATIONS § 182 (2001), and also see Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 282 U.S. 
440 (1931) and Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276, 279 (1961). 
110   See e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Jenkins, 297 U.S. 629, 56 S.Ct. 611 (1936); Furst v. Brewster, 282 U.S. 
493, 51 S.Ct. 295 (1931); Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hinkle, 278 U.S. 460, 49 S.Ct. 204 (1929); FLETCHER 
supra note 109, at § 8388; and AM. JUR., supra note 109, at § 192. 
111   See Richard M. Buxbaum,  The Threatened Constitutionalization of the Internal Affairs Doctrine in 
Corporation Law, 75 CAL. L R EV. 29 (1987); Willis L.M. Reese & Edmund M. Kaufman, The Law 
Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law and the Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 
1118 (1958); Donald C. Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A 
Comment on CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 101 HARV. L. REV. 96 (1987); STEFAN KLEIN, 
DIE RECHTSSTELLUNG AUSWÄRTIGER GESELLSCHAFTEN IM DEUTSCHEN UND US-AMERIKANISCHEN RECHT 
360-396 (2004).  
112   On this question, see Langevoort, supra note 111, at 110-118. 
113   U.S. Const., art. IV, § 2 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of 
Citizens in the several States."). 
114   See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519 (1839), discussed in GEVURTZ, supra note 35, at 37-38, and 
Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 US 181, 8 S Ct 7 (1888). 
115   U.S. Const., art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, 
and judicial Proceedings of every other State."). 
116   For a thorough, recent discussion (in German), see KLEIN, supra note 111, at 383-388; and for older 
treatment by US experts, see Buxbaum, supra note 111, at 43-47, and Reese & Kaufman, supra note 111, 
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on internal affairs continue to expand as they have in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  Given that state courts 
do not have ultimate authority in matters of federal constitutional law, predictable assertions of 
authority that have been made by the Delaware and California courts should not be given undue 
weight on this issue.
117 
Therefore, although cases addressing possible conflicts between  federal  and state law, have 
stressed that because corporations are "creatures of the states," state law should be given considerable 
deference in questions of internal affairs,
118 this does not necessarily mean that such deference must be 
given in equal degree if there is a conflict between two states.  It would seem that US states have a 
considerably freer hand than their EU member state counterparts under the decisions of the European 
Court of Justice in regulating the presence of "foreign" corporations doing business on their soil.
119  
Nevertheless, given the degree to which company law has – and is still being – harmonized throughout 
the European Union, the "threat", if any, posed by foreign companies to host member states is 
considerably smaller than what might be imagined in the United States. 
Federal and state to securities exchanges. Listing requirements are merely contractual in 
nature,
120 and would thus be invalid if they violated either state or federal law.
121  However, if a listing 
rule were to violate a state law while complying with a valid federal rule, such violation would likely 
imply that the state law was invalid under the US Constitution's supremacy clause.  The general 
picture (see Figure 2) is thus a hierarchy with the federal government on top, the state governments in 
the middle, and the stock exchanges on the bottom, with the significant caveat that pursuant to § 19 
Exchange Act the SEC supervises all significant rule changes of national exchanges and may instruct 
                                                   
117   See Draper v. Paul N. Gardner Defined Plan Trust, 625 A.2d 859, 665-66 (1993) (In a case involving a 
Delaware corporation doing business primarily in California, it was necessary to decide whether 
California or Delaware law controlled the standard for dismissing a derivative suit filed by a shareholder, 
and the Delaware Supreme Court found that the matter was governed by Delaware law, asserting that 
application of the internal affairs doctrine is mandated by constitutional principles, except in "the rarest 
situations.")  The courts of California, on the other hand, have approved imposing their cumulative voting 
provisions on pseudo-foreign corporations (Wilson v. Louisiana-Pacific Resources, Inc., 138 Cal. App. 3d 
216, 187 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1982)), and applied conflicting, Californian rules on shareholder information 
rights to Delaware corporations (Valtz v. Penta Investment Corp., 188 Cal. Rptr. 922 (1983)). 
118   See CTS, 481 U.S. at 86, and Green, 430 U.S. at 479. 
119   See Part III.B.1. 
120   "[M]ost exchange rules that regulate the behavior of listed companies are no more  than contractual 
undertakings by the listed company to make particular choices from the menu of state corporate law."  
Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1453, 1498 (1997).  For copies of the 
agreements between an issuer and the exchange used when listing securities, see the websites of the 
NYSE, supra note 18, and the Nasdaq Stock Market, supra note 49. 
121   See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (2005) and John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, 
The Law of Contracts 495 (4
th ed. 1998).  Aside from the invalidity under contract law, § 19(b)(3)(C) 
Exchange Act provides that a "rule change of a self-regulatory organization which has taken effect . . . 
may be enforced by such organization to the extent it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this title, 
the rules and regulations thereunder, and applicable Federal and State law." The Laws Applicable to Corporations 
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the exchanges to adopt specific rules,
122 thereby giving the rules a federal shading.  Because the SEC 
operates under power delegated to it through the Exchange Act, it may not instruct a securities 
exchange to adopt a rule in an area not covered by such delegated power.  The Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit found in 1990 that an SEC rule that would have required exchanges to maintain a 
one share/one vote policy was beyond the agency's statutory authority because, in the court's opinion, 
voting rights were part of internal corporate governance and beyond t he disclosure focus of the 
Exchange Act.
123  As Prof. Joel Seligman has observed, the court's decision not only ignores the SEC's 
plenary power under the Exchange Act to change or abrogate exchange rules,
124 but also fails to 
explain how, if exchanges can adopt rules that go well beyond disclosure, and the SEC has unlimited 
power over this process, the SEC's own affirmative capacity can be limited to disclosure rules.
125  The 
expansion of the Exchange Act into "internal" matters through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act amendments 
may lead future courts to reach different conclusions regarding the scope of the SEC's power in such 
matters. 
3. The flexibility of the various sets of rules. 
As stated above, state corporation statutes are composed of some mandatory and many optional 
rules, but are generally considered to be enabling statutes that allow shareholders to shape their 
companies.  Prof. Jeffrey Gordon finds "four sorts of mandatory rules in modern [American] 
corporation statutes: procedural, power allocating, economic transformative, and fiduciary standards 
setting."
126  These categories would include such matters as (procedural) establishing a mandatory 
procedure for calling shareholder meetings, ( allocating) giving shareholders the right to elect and 
remove directors, (transformative) requiring a shareholder vote on transactions that would change the 
nature of the corporation, and (fiduciary) duties of care and loyalty applied by courts to "to restrain 
insiders in exercising their discretionary power over the corporation  and its shareholders in 
contingencies not specifically foreseeable and thus over which the parties could not contract."
127  
Federal statutes are completely mandatory.  Listing requirements are mandatory, although they provide 
                                                   
122   The procedure by which national securities exchanges may change their rules in provided for in § 19(b) 
Exchange Act.  According to this provision an exchange must file copies of any proposed rule change 
with the SEC, stating the proposed rule's basis and purpose. The SEC then provides notice of the proposal 
and gives interested persons an opportunity to comment.  Usually with 35 days, the SEC will then order 
the rule change or institute proceedings to determine whether the proposal should be disapproved.  Under 
certain circumstances rules may enter into effect immediately without the waiting period. No rule 
proposal can become effective without SEC approval.  See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 48, at 776-779. 
123   See Business Roundtable, 905 F. 2d at 411-413. 
124   See § 19(b)(3)(C) Exchange Act ("the Commission summarily may abrogate the change in the rules of the 
self-regulatory organization . . . and require that the proposed rule change be refilled.") 
125   LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 48, at 778-779. 
126   Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1591 (1989).  
127   Id. at 1593. The Laws Applicable to Corporations 
DRAFT: OCTOBER 2005 
 
 
- 24 - 
flexibility for foreign listed c ompanies that are subject to different legal systems.  The overall 
flexibility of the set of corporate governance rules for both Delaware and foreign companies listed on a 
US securities exchange has been reduced by the mandatory, federal rules affecting "internal matters" 
introduced by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the SEC implementing rules, which did not create waivers 
or significant derogations for foreign companies.
128 
B. The Republic of Germany 
The jurisdictions that create the rules governing public companies in Germany are the Republic 
of Germany (e.g., the Aktiengesetz),
129 the European Union, which has significantly shaped German 
law through directives, and has also enacted some directly applicable EU regulations (e.g., the Listing 
Regulation and the Regulation creating a Societas Europae), and the securities exchange on which the 
company's securities are listed (e.g., the Frankfurt Stock Exchange). 
Figure 3 presents a summary graphic of the three characteristics already discussed for US 
companies as applied to the three jurisdictions issuing rules for publicly listed companies in Germany.  
As in sub-part A, the following paragraphs 1 through 3 will discuss these characteristics in turn. 
Figure 3: The Jurisdictional Breakdown of Rules Governing German Corporations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. The areas each jurisdiction's laws or rules traditionally cover   
With the exception of labor participation and the fiduciary duties of directors, which remain 
national law questions, it is difficult to draw a clean line separating areas traditionally covered by 
German company law from those covered by EU law.  It may be argued, as does Prof. Stefan 
                                                   
128   See notes 68-71 and accompanying text. 
129   Like the United States, Germany has a federal structure, and the individual states, or  Länder, have 
significant power in the federal government through the German Parliament's second house, the 
Bundesrat.  See Arthur B. Gunlicks, German Federalism and Recent Reform Efforts, 6 GERMAN LAW 
JOURNAL 1283, 1285 (2005).  Although the Länder do not enact company law, they have supervisory 
authority over stock exchanges located in their territory. 
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Grundmann, that EU company law displays a tendency leaning more heavily toward disclosure.
130  
However, the demarcation is by no means as pronounced as in the United States.  Both German and 
EU company law cover matters connected to each of the five core characteristics of a corporation, plus 
disclosure and accounting.  EU securities law, which has in part been implemented through German 
law and in part adopted in directly applicable regulations, covers a wide area focusing on disclosure 
and the prevention of securities fraud.
131  Aside from administrative law provisions on the licensing 
and management of securities exchanges,
132 German securities laws are substantially composed of 
implemented EU law.
133  The initial and continuing listing standards of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
contain disclosure and accounting rules resembling those of US stock exchanges, but delve less deeply 
into internal affairs.
134  Pursuant to §   161 AktG, listed companies must comply with a Corporate 
Governance Code of best market practices or explain in the notes to their financial statements why 
they have chosen not so to conform.
135  The Code contains requirements that are very comparable to 
the corporate governance standards found in the NYSE Listed Company Manual, such as a general 
policy of one share/one vote,
136 a shareholder-friendly calling and holding of the annual meeting,
137 
and the requirement that an audit committee with an  independent chairperson be set up in the 
supervisory board.
138    
Ten of the company law directives adopted by the European Union harmonize the law on many 
key aspects of and transactions conducted by public corporations.
139  They represent an effort to create 
a single standard for corporations in the European Union, that ran strong from the late 1960s to the 
mid-1980's.  This harmonization program was advocated most strongly by France, which feared that 
                                                   
130   See Stefan Grundmann, The Structure of European Company Law: From Crisis to Boom, 5 EBOR 601, 6 
(2004).  For example, third parties are protected in dealings with the company by disclosure of the 
persons authorized to bind the company, the capital and financial condition of the company is disclosed, 
and shareholders are protected in mergers by disclosure of a detailed merger plan. 
131   For a recent, insightful treatment of EU securities law, see FERRAN, supra note 11. 
132   See §§ 1-23 Exchange Act (Börsengesetz), In the version published on June 26, 2002 (Federal Law 
Reporter I p. 2010), last amended by the by Article 3 of the Investor Protection Improvement Act of 
October 28, 2004 (Federal Law Reporter I p. 2630). 
133   One leading expert estimates that about 80 % of German securities law follows EU directives.  Siegfried 
Kümpel, Kapitalmerktrecht – Eine Einführung, in SIEGFRIED KÜMPEL et al., eds. KAPITALMARKTRECHT 
HANDBUCH FÜR DIE PRAXIS 1, 6 (2005). 
134   See Rules of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange ( Börsenordnung für die Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse) 
(updated to July 1, 2005), available at http://www.deutsche-boerse.com. 
135   See German Corporate Governance Code ( Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex), available at 
http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/. 
136   Id. at § 2.1.2. 
137   Id. at § 2.3. 
138   Id. at § 5.3.2. 
139   See GRUNDMANN, supra note 12, at 48-56, and EDWARDS, supra note 12, at 1-15. The Laws Applicable to Corporations 
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companies subject to inferior regulation would operate on its territory, and harmonization was 
considered less a step toward achieving a single market than "an entrance fee Member States accepted 
to pay for market integration."
140  The First Company Law Directive, adopted in 1968, imposed a 
harmonized system of disclosure for companies to publish facts regarding their incorporation, legal 
capital and financial results, as well as to specify those persons authorized to represent the company in 
dealings with third parties.
141  The Second Company Law Directive, adopted  in 1976, provided 
harmonized rules for the incorporation of public companies and the maintenance of their capital, 
including a procedure for auditing the value of in-kind contributions to capital, restrictions on dividend 
distributions and share repurchases, a prohibition of "financial assistance", mandatory preemptive 
rights, and a required shareholder vote for certain changes in the company's capital.
142  Even taken 
alone, these two Directives already regulate the corporation's core characteristics.  They provide rules 
on the creation and actual representation of the corporation as a legal person, the capital maintenance 
requirements that are by many considered a quid pro quo for its limited liability, the nature of certain 
rights attaching to its shares, and the rights of shareholders with respect to changes in the company 
capital.  Only the nature and operation of the company's centralized management under a board is left 
to national law.  The remainder of the first, nine company law directives aim to harmonize 
accounting,
143 or address specific company actions or topics, such as mergers and divisions,
144 the 
establishment of branches in other member states,
145 or guarantee that the existence of a single-
                                                   
140   Christiaan Timmermans, Harmonization in the Future Company Law in Europe, in Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy 
Wymeersch, eds., CAPITAL MARKETS AND COMPANY LAW 623, 628 (2003); Grundmann, Structure, supra 
note 130, at 605. 
141   First Council Directive (68/151/EEC), supra note 14.  
142   Second Council Directive (77/91/EEC) of 13 December 1976 on coordination of safeguards which, for 
the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within 
the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of the formation of public 
limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a view to making such 
safeguards equivalent throughout the Community, 1977 O.J. (L/26) 1; see also consolidated version as 
amended thorough January 1, 1995, available at www.eurlex.eu. 
143   Accounting measures include:  Fourth Council Directive (78/660/EEC) of 25 July 1978 based on Article 
54(3)(g) of the Treaty on the annual accounts of certain types of companies, 1978 O.J. (L 222) 11; 
Seventh Council Directive (83/349/EEC) of 13 June 1983 based on the Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on 
consolidated accounts, 1983, O.J. (L 193) 1; Eighth Council Directive (84/253/EEC) of 10 April 1984 
based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on the approval of persons responsible for carrying out the 
statutory audits of accounting documents, 1984 O.J. (L 126) 20; as well as the more recent Regulation No 
1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 July 2002 on the application of 
international accounting standards, 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1.  For a thorough discussion of these measures, see 
GRUNDMANN, supra note 12, at §§ 14-16 and EDWARDS, supra note 12, at chapters V-VII.  
144   See Third Council Directive (78/855/EEC) of 9 October 1978 based on Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty 
concerning mergers of public limited liability companies, 1977 O.J. (L 295) 36;  see also consolidated 
version as amended thorough January 1, 1995 at  www.eurlex.eu; and Sixth Council Directive 
82/891/EEC of 17 December 1982 based on Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty, concerning the division of 
public limited liability companies, 1982 O.J. (L 378) 47.  
145   Eleventh Council Directive 89/666/EEC of 21 December 1989 concerning disclosure requirements in 
respect of branches opened in a Member State by certain types of company governed by the law of The Laws Applicable to Corporations 
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shareholder company will be respected throughout the Union.
146  In recent years, the European Union 
has managed to finally adopt longstanding proposals for a directive regulating takeovers,
147 and a 
regulation/directive package enabling the creation of European Companies (a porous framework that is 
filled in by the company law of its member state of incorporation and seat).
148  All of the directives are 
already or soon will be implemented into German company law, and the SE Regulation is both directly 
binding as law in Germany and has been tied into German law with a special piece of legislation that 
directs how the gaps in the loose, supranational framework are to be filled in.
149  From this brief 
overview, we can see that EU and German law do not primarily exist on separate, parallel planes like 
the federal/state relationship in the United States,
150 but have been fused at numerous points ( see 
Figure 3).   
The drive to harmonization that led to this mixed company law waned at the time that the Single 
European Act was being drafted in the mid-1980's, giving way to a preference for home country rule 
and "subsidiarity".
151  The harmonization process then stopped.  However, a series of decisions by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) since 1999 on the basis of the right of establishment guaranteed 
companies in Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty has once again cut deeply into the national company 
laws of the member states, including Germany.  In Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen,
152 
the ECJ found that Denmark must allow a UK private limited company freely to establish itself in its 
territory, even if Danish citizens bought the company for the sole purpose of evading Denmark's 
stricter laws on capital adequacy and none of the company's activity takes place in its home state.
153  In 
                                                                                                                                                               
another State, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 36.  This Directive is discussed at length in the European Court of 
Justice's decision in Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam and Inspire 
Art Ltd, [2003] ECR I-10155. 
146   Twelfth Council Company Law Directive of 21 December 1989 on single-member private limited-
liability companies, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 40. 
147   Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids, 
2004 O.J. (L 142) 12. 
148   SE Statute and SE Directive, supra note 13. 
149   The European Company Implementation Act (Gesetz zur Einführung der Europäischen Gesellschaft), 
German Federal Law Reporter (BGBl) vol. I, p. 3675 (Dec. 22, 2004). Although national law will fill in 
gaps in the Regulation, it is important to remember that many of the gaps have been left in areas already 
harmonized by earlier EU directives. 
150   See the discussion of US federal and US state law in sub-part A, above. 
151   See Timmermans, supra note 140, at 626-630. The concept of "subsidiarity" will be discussed in detail in 
the following section.  A major breakthrough in the philosophy of home country rule came in the famous 
Cassis de Dijon movement of goods case, Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung 
für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649.  On this point, also see Grundmann, Structure, supra note 130, at 617, 
arguing that the principle of home rule is essentially disclosure or information-oriented in nature. 
152   Case No. C-212/97, Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, [1999] ECR I-01459. 
153   Centros, [1999] ECR I-01459, at par. 39. The Laws Applicable to Corporations 
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Uberseering BV v Nordic Construction Company  Baumanagement GmbH,
154 the ECJ found 
Germany's conflict of laws rules as they had been applied to a Dutch company to impede freedom of 
establishment.  Unlike the United States, which applies the "incorporation theory,"
155 meaning that the 
internal affairs of a corporation are governed by the laws of its state of incorporation, Germany applies 
the "real seat" (or siège réel) theory, meaning that the internal affairs of a corporation are governed by 
the laws of the state where it has its center of administration.
156  The application of the real seat theory 
to a Dutch company whose shares came to be owned by Germans and which was operated in 
Germany, resulted in the German courts applying German law to the company, finding that it was not 
properly constituted and registered as a German corporation, and then denying it the legal capacity to 
sue in a court of law.
157  The ECJ, following its decision in Centros, found that denying a company 
duly formed in another member state legal capacity to be party to legal proceedings was "tantamount 
to an outright negation of the freedom of establishment conferred on companies by Articles 43 and 48" 
of the EC Treaty.
158  The Court rejected Germany's argument that application of its own company law 
to pseudo-foreign corporations was justified because it enhanced legal certainty, and the protection of 
creditors and minority shareholders.
159  It is unclear whether the  Überseering decision has changed 
Germany's conflict of laws rules for corporations, the substantive law that results from their 
application, or both.
160  The seat theory will likely remain, in any case, for companies incorporated 
outside of the European Union, unless a friendship treaty applies.
161  In its next, major decision in this 
area, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam and Inspire Art Ltd,
162 the ECJ held that a 
                                                   
154   Case C-208/00, Uberseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH, [2002] ECR I-
09919. 
155   SCOLES et. al., supra note 34, at § 23.2. 
156   See Wulf-Henning Roth,  From Centros to Ueberseering: Free Movement of Companies, Private 
International Law, and Community Law, 52 ICLQ 175, 180-81 (2003); and  SCOLES et. al., supra note 34, 
at § 23.1.  According to Prof. Roth, the "center of administration" as understood in Germany is "the 
location where the internal management decisions are transformed into the day-to-day activities of a 
company." Id. at 181, citing the decision of the German High Federal Court reported in BGHZ 97, 269, at 
272. 
157   Uberseering, [2002] ECR I-09919, at pars. 6-12.  
158   Uberseering, [2002] ECR I-09919, at par. 93. 
159   Uberseering, [2002] ECR I-09919, at pars. 83-94. 
160   Roth, supra note 156, at 207-208. 
161   For example, the friendship and commerce treaty between the United States and Germany provides in 
Article VII that "[n]ationals and companies of either Party shall be accorded, within the territories of the 
other Party, national treatment with respect to engaging in all types of commercial, industrial, financial 
and other activity for gain, whether in a dependent or an independent capacity, and whether directly or by 
agent or through the medium of any form of lawful juridical entity. for the recognition of companies and 
their right to enter and trade in the jurisdiction."  Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, July 
14, 1956, U.S.- Germany, art. VII, 7 U.S.T. 1839. 
162   Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam and Inspire Art Ltd, [2003] ECR 
I-10155. The Laws Applicable to Corporations 
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Dutch outreach statute against pseudo-foreign corporations was inconsistent with the EC Treaty.  The 
statute required the branches of companies incorporated abroad to make disclosures beyond those 
provided for in the Eleventh Company Law directive, and that imposed unlimited liability as a penalty 
for a failure to comply with these and other requirements, such as a minimum capital requirement.
163  
From the perspective of a comparative analysis with US federalism, the  Inspire Art  decision is 
interesting in that it is based both on freedom of establishment (which is not guaranteed for companies 
by the US Constitution),
164 and a theory of preemption of member state action by an EU directive,
165 
which is the strongest theory for invalidating state law under the US Constitution. 
By rolling back the member state regulation of foreign corporations, it would seem that the ECJ 
had opened the gates to significant regulatory competition.  Indeed, scholarly speculation is high as to 
whether the motivational and legal conditions behind US regulatory competition can be found to exist 
in Europe.
166  However, as Prof. Klaus Hopt, the German representative on the EU High Level Group 
of Company Law Experts has observed, in coming years a number of proposals may be adopted to 
further harmonize EU company law.
167  Although most of the planned measures would not be as rigid 
as the first, nine directives,
168 they would focus on "internal" governance matters,
169 and if such 
matters are roughly synchronized, this would reduce the area of play for regulatory competition and 
stabilize the opening that the ECJ has created.  This is especially true when one considers that a 
Societas Europae is alredy available for incorporation at the European level, and that the Action Plan 
proposes creating more supranational forms.
170  The SE Regulation specifies certain aspects of a 
Societas Europaea's corporate structure that are to be filled in by national law, and if the "open areas" 
                                                   
163   Inspire Art, [2003] ECR I-10155, at par. 143. 
164   See sub-part A.2, above. 
165   Inspire Art, [2003] ECR I-10155, at pars. 66-72. 
166   See Armour, supra note 4, and Gelter, supra note 4. 
167   Klaus Hopt, Europäisches Gesellschaftrecht und deutsche Unternehmensverfassung – Aktionsplan und 
Interdependenzen 11 ZIP 461, 463 (2005), discussing the Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament: Modernizing Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance 
in the European Union – A Plan to Move Forward, COM (2003) 284 final ("Action Plan"). 
168   The Action Plan lists as its "guiding political criteria," a full respect for "subsidiarity and proportionality," 
and states that the measures should be "flexible in application, but firm in the principles."  Action Plan, at 
4. 
169   Measures that are being or already have been drafted are a directive to increase the collective 
responsibility of board members, recommendations to increase the presence of independent directors and 
better regulate director remuneration, and a directive to facilitate shareholder communications and 
decision-making, as well as a project to coordinate the national corporate governance codes adopted by 
member states. See Action Plan, at 10-17. 
170   See Action Plan, at 22.  However, the Action Plan reports the High Level Group recommended 
performing a feasibility study before beginning work on a European private limited company (Id. at 21), 
which is significant because most of the questions regarding regulatory competition arise for this business 
form, as  the Second Company Directive's capital maintenance requirements apply only to public 
companies.  The Laws Applicable to Corporations 
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to be filled have already been harmonized or will be addressed under the Acton Plan, there would be 
almost nothing for a member state to offer when competing with its neighbors for charters – unless the 
competition were to move to related, topical laws such as bankruptcy.
171  
A separate body  of EU directives and regulations on securities regulation supplements the 
company law made through these directives and ECJ decisions.  They regulate the disclosure that is 
required for the sale of securities in the primary markets,
172 disclosure and reporting requirements for 
listed companies,
173 insider dealing and market manipulation,
174 and the behavior of the authorized 
participants in the securities markets.
175  The newer legislation depends less on the traditional 
technique of adopting a directive and having the member states implement it, and more on creating 
implementing law directly at the supranational level.  This is currently done with a four-level approach 
recommended by an expert committee under the direction of Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy in its 
February, 2001, “Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European 
Securities Markets,”
176 and temporarily adopted by the Union.  The "four levels" consist of: 
•  Level 1: general principles; 
•  Level 2 : detailed, implementing legislation adopted  by the European Commission, in 
consultation with a newly formed Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR); 
•  Level 3: interpretive regulations developed by CESR; and 
•  Level 4: Commission polices for compliance. 
Following this procedure, the Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation Directive has been fleshed out 
by detailed implementing legislation,
177 and CESR implementing measures.
178 Similarly, the 
                                                   
171   See Armour, supra note 4. at 38-50. 
172   See Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the 
prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and amending 
Directive 2001/34/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 64. 
173   See Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the 
harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are 
admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending Directive 2001/34/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 38.  
174   Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing 
and market manipulation (market abuse), 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16. 
175   See Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21. April 2004 on markets in 
financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC, 2004 O.J. (L 
145) 1. 
176   The text of the Report is available at  http://europa.eu.int.  For a detailed analysis of this four-level 
procedure, see Ferran, supra note 11, at 61-126. 
177   Commission Directive 2004/72/EC of 29 April 2004 on implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council as regards accepted market practices, the definition of inside 
information in relation to derivatives on commodities, the drawing up of lists of insiders, the notification 
of managers' transactions and the notification of suspicious transactions, 2004 O.J. (L 162) 70, and 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 2273/2003 of 22 December 2003 implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council as regards exemptions for buy-back programmes and The Laws Applicable to Corporations 
DRAFT: OCTOBER 2005 
 
 
- 31 - 
Prospectus Directive has been fleshed out with a very detailed Prospectus Regulation,
179 which 
operates something like Regulation S - K in the United States,
180 and obviates detailed national 
legislation on the content of prospectuses.  In fact, the newly adopted German Securities Prospectus 
Act defines the required, minimum content of a prospectus under German law with a brief reference to 
the EU Prospectus Regulation.
181   
Given this rather heavy blanket of laws and regulations covering German companies, it is 
understandable that the initial and continued listing requirements of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange are 
somewhat lighter than their US counterparts.  They primarily require disclosures that are somewhat 
stricter than those specified in applicable law.  For example, a company's whose shares are admitted to 
the premium market segment, referred to as "prime standard", must prepare their financial statements 
in a manner compatible with International Accounting Standards (note that this is now required by EU 
law), and publish reports including financial statements on a quarterly, rather than merely semiannual 
basis, as required by the federal, Exchange Admission Regulation (Börsenzulassungs-Verordnung).
182 
2. The relationship of the jurisdictions to each other 
Community to Member States. As the European Community is the lawmaking portion of the 
European Union,
183 the Community's relationship to the member states is relevant for this paper.  The 
relationship between the Community and Germany is more complex than the relationship between the 
                                                                                                                                                               
stabilisation of financial instruments, 2003 O.J. (L 336) 33, and Commission Directive 2003/125/EC of 
22 December 2003 implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as 
regards the fair presentation of investment recommendations and the disclosure of conflicts of interest, 
2003 O.J. (L 339) 73. 
178   CESR, "Additional Level 2 Implementing Measures for Market Abuse Directive," CESR/03-213b (Aug. 
2003). 
179   Commission Regulation (EC) No 809/2004 of 29 April 2004 implementing Directive 2003/71/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council as regards information contained in prospectuses as well as the 
format, incorporation by reference and publication of such prospectuses and dissemination of 
advertisements, 2004 O.J. (L 149) 1. 
180   See 17 C.F.R. Part 229. 
181   See § 7 of the German Securities Prospectus Act (Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie 2001/71/EG des 
Europäisches Parlaments und des Rates von 4. November 2003 betreffend den Prospekt, der beim 
öffentlichen Angebot von Wertpapieren oder deren Zulassung zum Handel zu veröffentlichen ist, und zur 
Änderung der Richtlinie 2001/34/EG (Prospektrichtlinie-Umsetzungsgesetz)), German Federal Law 
Reporter (BGBl) vol. I, 1698 (June 27, 2005). 
182   See Rules of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, supra note 134, §§ 62 and 63, and Exchange Admission 
Regulation, §§ 53-62.available at the website of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, http://www.deutsche-
boerse.com. 
183   See Art. 5, Treaty on European Union, Dec. 24, 2002, O.J. 5 (C 325) (2002) (EU Treaty) (Specifying the 
institutions of the European Community as exercising powers under the EC Treaty and the EU Treaty.), 
and Art. 249 EC Treaty (Directing the European Parliament, Council and Commission to make 
regulations and issue directives.); see also Manfred Zuleeg, Grundsätze, in KOMMENTAR ZUM VERTRAG 
ÜBER DIE EUROPÄISCHE UNION UND ZUR GRÜNDUNG DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT, vol. 1, p. 574 
(Hans von der Groeben & Jürgen Schwarze, eds., 6
th ed. 2003). The Laws Applicable to Corporations 
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United States and Delaware.  Within areas where the Community has been delegated competence that 
is not concurrent, the ECJ has interpreted the EC Treaty to mean that EU law is supreme over the 
member states,
184 but the German Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgericht) has expressly reserved 
national, sovereign power, which it will however not  exercise so long as the Community remains 
within its delegated powers and does not violate basic rights guaranteed in the German Constitution.
185  
Within those areas where the European Community has not been given exclusive competence, the 
relationship between the Community and the member states is described by the concept of 
"subsidiarity" under Article 5 of the EC Treaty, which includes the imperative that "the Community 
shall take action . . . only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, be better achieved by the Community."
186  The Community is given the express duty to 
guarantee the freedom of establishment in A rticles 43 through 48 of the EC Treaty, but the 
promulgation of company law is not an express Community function, and thus the company law area 
should be thought of as one of "concurrent jurisdiction",
187 to which the principle of subsidiarity could 
apply.  In this area, however, the Community's exercise of power is judged primarily according to 
whether it abused the power delegated to it in the EC Treaty, and thus application of the principle of 
subsidiarity would add little to the evaluation.
188 
The company law directives discussed in section 1 were adopted on the basis of Art. 44(2)(g) 
EC Treaty, which instructs the European Council to adopt directives to coordinate, "to the necessary 
extent the safeguards . . . required by Member States of companies . . . with a view to making such 
safeguards equivalent throughout the Community."
189  The word  "safeguards" recalls Justice 
Timmerman's point, mentioned in section 1, that the harmonization program was an entrance fee for 
market integration.
190  The ECJ decisions discussed in section 1 were made on the basis of Articles 43 
                                                   
184   Case 26/62, NV. Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse 
Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1, 12 ("the Community constitutes a new legal order of 
international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within 
limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals.").  For 
a good discussion in German, see Zuleeg, supra note 183, at 582-585. 
185   See most recently Decision of the Constitutional Court of June 7, 2000, 2 BvL 1/97, available at the 
website of the German Constitutional Court at http://www.bverfg.de/cgi-bin/link.pl?entscheidungen.  An 
older decision (reprinted in English) expressing a similar line of reasoning on sovereignty is Brunner v. 
The European Union Treaty [1994] 1 CMLR 57. 
186   Art. 5, EC Treaty. 
187   Zuleeg, supra note 183, at 623-24. 
188   See GRUNDMANN, supra note 12, at 45-46, with further citations, and the discussion of Art. 44 EC Treaty 
in Peter Troberg & Jürgen Tiedge, Das Niederlassungsrecht, in von der Groeben & Schwarze, supra note 
183, at Vol. 1, 1442, 1535-37. 
189   See EDWARDS, supra note 12, at 3-14, and GRUNDMANN, supra note 12, at 48, 69-72. 
190   See supra note 140, and accompanying text. The Laws Applicable to Corporations 
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and 48 of the EC Treaty, which apply the guarantee of freedom of establishment to companies.  As 
already said, a "directive" is binding, as to the result to be achieved, but leaves the national authorities 
the choice of form and methods of implementation.
191  Nevertheless, once a directive has been 
adopted, it works to pre-empt conflicting national legislation.  The ECJ explained this in its Inspire Art 
decision, where it concluded that the Eleventh Company Law Directive on the establishment of 
branches in other member states provides an "exhaustive" list of required and optional disclosures that 
may be required of such branches, and held that the disclosure requirements imposed by The 
Netherlands' Law on Formally Foreign Companies were pre-empted by the Directive.
192  
State to State. The ECJ does not hesitate in the cases such as Centros, Überseering, and Inspire 
Art to declare member state laws unlawful if they burden the freedom of establishment of a company 
formed under the laws of another member state, unless the laws of the host state remain with the 
criteria set forth in Gebhard: 
•  they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner,  
•  they must be justified by imperative requirements in the public interest,  
•  they must be suitable for securing  the attainment of the objective which they pursue, and  
•  they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.
193 
The vertical impact of these decisions is to apply a clear principle of supremacy of EU law  over 
member state national company law, and the horizontal impact is to create standards that a member 
state may use in assessing the permissibility of its company law and related legislation on companies 
formed under the law of another member state.  One  clear rule from the decisions is that although 
member states may protect themselves from fraudulent actions by foreign companies, the deliberate 
use of a system of company law that relies on disclosure, especially one found in the 1
st and 11
th 
Company Law  Directives, rather than legal capital to protect creditors does not constitute such 
fraudulent action.
194 
State to securities exchange. German securities exchanges adopt their rules pursuant to all three 
layers of state hierarchy: the European Community, the Republic of Germany, and the Land (province 
or federal state) in which they are located.  For the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, the relevant Land is the 
State of Hesse.  Pursuant to § 32 of the German Exchange Act,
195 the federal government issues an 
                                                   
191   Article 249 EC Treaty. 
192   See Inspire Art, [2003] ECR I-10155, Par. 65-71. 
193   Case C-55/94, Gebhard [1995] ECR I-4165, Par. 37. 
194   See Timmermans, supra note 140, at 633. 
195   § 32(1) requires that the regulation contain "provisions necessary to protect the public and for orderly 
exchange trading, regarding: 1. admission requirements, and in particular: a) requirements for the issuer 
regarding its legal form, its size and the duration of its existence; b) requirements for the securities to be 
admitted regarding their legal basis, negotiability, face value, and printed format; c) the minimum amount The Laws Applicable to Corporations 
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exchange a dmission regulation, which provides guidelines on the procedure to be used and 
requirements to be met when admitting securities to listing on the exchange.
196  A governing body of 
the exchange, an "exchange council" ( Börsenrat) on which representatives of listed companies and 
market participants are seated, then issues more detailed Exchange Rules.
197  These rules must be 
approved by the supervisory authority of the  Land, which in the State of Hesse is the Commerce 
Ministry.
198  As the Exchange Rules are issued pursuant to the German Exchange Act and under the 
supervision of state authority, they take on the character of a public law charter (öffentlich-rechtliche 
Satzung),
199 which gave ground for considerable speculation when, in 2001, they were changed to de-
list substandard companies from the Frankfurt Stock Exchange.
200  Provisions of EU law must be taken 
into account at each level within Germany.  The resulting character of the relationship between the 
state and the exchanges is thus somewhat like that between the European Community and Germany: 
there is substantial instruction given from above, and the resulting rules on the lower level are 
permeated with provisions formulated on the higher level. 
3. The flexibility of the various sets of rules. 
The Aktiengesetz is, in itself, quite inflexible.  Section 23(5) AktG provides that the company 
charter may deviate from the provisions of the law only where expressly provided for in the law, and 
such express grants are not generously provided.  As Prof. Karsten Schmidt notes, pursuant to German 
corporate law, "the constitution-like, prescribed structure of the stock corporation may be altered only 
slightly by the articles of incorporation, given that  – contrary to limited liability companies and 
partnerships  – the stock c orporation is governed by  the principle that the form of constitutional 
documents is strictly prescribed."
201  Indeed, Prof. Hans-Joachim Mertens quipped in an essay written 
                                                                                                                                                               
of the issue; d) the requirement that the application for admission include all shares of the same class or 
all debt securities of the same issue; 2. the language and the content of the prospectus, in particular the 
securities to be admitted and the issuer, its capital, business activity, assets and liabilities, financial 
position, management and supervisory bodies, its recent development and prospects, any lockup 
agreements between the issuer and its shareholders, including any understandings and measures designed 
to secure performance on the agreement, as well as the persons or companies that take responsibility for 
the contents of the prospectus; 3. the date on which the prospectus is to be published; and 4.  the 
admissions procedure."  § 32(1) German Exchange Act, author's translation. 
196   See Exchange Admission Regulation, supra note 182. 
197   §§ 9 and 13 German Exchange Act. 
198   § 13(5) Exchange Act. For a discussion of the approval process see Martin E. Foelsch, Grundzüge des 
Börsenwesens, in THORWALD HELLNER et al., eds., BANKRECHT UND BANKPRAXIS, vol. 4, 7/171, 7/183.  
199   Id. at 7/182. 
200   See Manfred Wolf, Der Ausschluß vom Neuen Markt und die Aufnahme von Ausschlußgründen in das 
Regelwerk Neuer Markt, 38 WM 1785 (2001), for an excellent analysis of the contract law problems 
arising in the unilateral amendment of this type of contact. 
201   SCHMIDT, supra note 32, at 771 (italics in original) (Author's translation).  For an interesting discussion of 
mandatory corporate law in Continental Europe, see Sofie Cools, "The Real Difference in Corporate Law 
between the United States and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers," Harvard John M. Olin Center The Laws Applicable to Corporations 
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shortly after German reunification that a future economic historian would have great difficulty in 
discerning whether the Aktiengesetz, with its strictly prescribed structure, originated in the capitalist or 
in the communist half of Germany.
202  
Although the provisions of the EU company law directives are generally mandatory, the 
European Union did introduce some flexibility into Germany and the other member states with the SE 
Regulation.  The Regulation allows shareholders to choose either a single-tier or a two-tier 
management board structure in settling up a Societas Europae,
203 and to specify a percentage of less 
than 10% of the shareholders to call a shareholders' meeting.
204  Perhaps the greatest source of 
flexibility coming from EU law, however, has been the ECJ's insistence that even pseudo-foreign 
corporations be given free reign within  the Union.  Taken to its logical extreme, this could allow 
German entrepreneurs to choose the company law of any EU Member State for their operations in 
Germany, athough Prof. Wulf-Henning Roth has argued that a rule like the one invalidated in 
Überseering might be valid if it provided for the smooth conversion of a foreign company into a 
German corporate form by operation of law.
205 
Like the initial and continuing listing standards of US securities exchanges, the federal 
Exchange Admittance Regulation and the rules of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange are mandatory.  
However, within the Exchange, there are a number of segments with differing standards to 
accommodate issuers of different size and stability.
206  The German Corporate Governance Codex 
allows companies to accept or reject it in whole or in part, but § 161 AktG requires that any failure by 
a listed company to comply with the Codex must be explained in the company's annual financial 
statements.  The entire structure of regulation offered German companies thus leaves very little room 
for adaptation to individual companies and circumstances. 
IV. What Company Law's Structure and Composition Can Tells us About Other Issues 
The foregoing analysis attempts to be factual and descriptive.  It hopes to present a description 
of the actual components of company law in Germany and Delaware.  It is designed as a roadmap for 
further comparative study of these two sets of laws.  It shows us that: 
•  The Aktiengesetz covers a wider range of topics than the DGCL and is considerably less 
flexible. 
                                                                                                                                                               
for Law, Economics, and Business, Discussion Paper No. 490 (Sept. 2004), available at The Social 
Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: http://ssrn.com/abstract=623286. 
202   Hans-Joachim Mertens, Satzungs- und Organisationsautonomie im Aktien- und Konzernrecht, 3 ZGR 426 
(1994 ). 
203   Art. 38(b), SE Regulation. 
204   Art. 55(1) SE Regulation. 
205   Roth, supra note 156, at 208. 
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•  What is studied as "company law" in both Germany and the United States includes other 
topical laws, notably securities regulation and a certain measure of accounting. 
•  US company law tends to import bankruptcy principles to fill in for laxer capital 
maintenance rules. 
•  Listing requirements in the United States are more extensive than those in Germany, 
and supplement gaps in legislation. 
•  Both German and Delaware law operate subject to preemption by a higher jurisdiction. 
•  The federal government in the United States could replace the DGCL, but appears 
unlikely to do so, while the European Union could not wholly replace the Aktiengesetz, 
although it has already significantly shaped it and plans to shape it even more. 
•  Because US federal law cannot instruct states to adopt rules or policies, federal and state 
law remain separate. 
•  German law is marbled with EU law and coexists with EU regulations that create 
alternative business forms. 
•  Securities laws for a German company do not come primarily from a higher jurisdiction, 
but are like the Aktiengesetz – national laws marbled with EU law and coexisting with 
directly applicable EU regulations. 
•  EU member states have a duty to allow corporations formed in other member states 
establish themselves freely, while US states have only a duty not to interfere with the 
constitutional rights of comparable companies  – particularly their rights to engage in 
interstate commerce. 
 
From these findings, we may conclude that the  Aktiengesetz  is comprehensive, inflexible and 
closely tied to EU law, while the Republic of Germany must take great care not to interfere with the 
operation of companies formed under either EU law or the law of another member state.  The DGCL is 
comparatively less comprehensive, quite flexible, and independent from federal law, while the State of 
Delaware can subject foreign corporations to significant regulation and other states, like California, 
may do the same to Delaware companies.  Both systems of law operate in juxtaposition to systems of 
securities regulation, but only Delaware would see such securities laws as a special threat to its area of 
competence, given that the European Union – unlike the United States – enacts company law directly.  
Both for historical reasons, and because US regulation is substantially less pervasive, the listing 
standards of US securities exchanges enter gaps and control company management to a much greater 
extent than do their European counterparts. 
Perhaps the main policy debate today concerning the interaction of legal systems falls under the 
rubric of  regulatory competition.
207  This is particularly true in Europe following the  Centros, 
Überseering, and Inspire Art decisions.  Regulatory competition is the competition that jurisdictions 
engage in to attract companies to incorporate under their law.  One of the main issues in the regulatory 
                                                   
207   Indeed, this issue was one of the most hotly debated questions in connection with the vote on the draft 
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competition debate is motive – motive of both the state and of the corporate promoters or management.  
The motivation of the state or country might be to attract revenues from taxes charged incorporated 
companies, as is the case in Delaware,
208 or some other benefit, such as an increase in fees earned by 
professionals licensed in the jurisdiction  – lawyers and consultants  – who provide services to 
corporations established under local  law.
209  The motive of the corporate promoters or management 
might be to seek out flexible laws that allow them to operate with little capital and reduce management 
accountability to shareholders and third parties ("race to the bottom").
210  Or the motive of s uch 
promoters or management might be to seek out an efficient, intelligent system of law so that their 
company can excel ("race to the top").
211  Although the type of study performed in this paper tells us 
next to nothing about motivation, it does allow us to see whether competition is possible and whether 
the (good or bad) effects of competition can be transmitted among the components of a legal system. 
A description of the elements of company law in Delaware and in Germany helps us understand 
the dynamics o f the systems that might be seen  to  compete.  Professors William W. Bratton and 
Joseph A. McCahery have provided an insightful and instructive analysis of US regulatory competition 
form the perspective of game theory, examining the development of two competitive equilibriums 
since the late 19
th century.
212  One equilibrium exists in the competition among states for corporate 
charters and the second exists among the makers of nationally applied securities laws.
213  The analysis 
of the contents of these equilibriums shows that although the federal system does adjust the results 
achieved by the state system,
214 state and federal products do not really compete, and thus laws like the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act do not eliminate the competition between states.
215  The entrance of the federal 
lawmaker into the area occupied by the state equilibrium does, however, affect the latter because it 
reduces the space  within which  competition among state laws occurs.  In a two-tiered (federalist or 
international) legal system, the greater the pervasiveness and impact of the law enacted by the higher 
tier, the less room there is for competition among the units of the lower tier.
216 
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Our analysis has shown that EU directives penetrate and determine the content of member state 
company laws  in a way that does not occur in the relationship between  US federal law  and state 
company law.  Except for rules on private limited companies, EU and national law are extensive and 
are substantially intertwined.  Moreover, the European Union has directly entered the member states' 
competitive equilibrium by creating its own corporate entity, albeit this entity is in part dependent on 
fill-ins from member state law.  Unlike the US system, in which states with flexible law have 
considerable space to compete under a  system of federal law, EU member states are tied to their 
ceiling of EU law, and one of the competing entities is supranational.  This, in addition to the other 
factors not addressed here such as differences in court systems, cultures and languages,
217 would seem 
to indicate a low potential for regulatory competition in Europe.  However, on the horizontal level, 
ECJ decisions like Inspire Art appear to give EU member states much less freedom to take unilateral 
action  to "protect" themselves against  foreign corporations than US states have under the US 
Constitution.
218  Horizontal freedom may compensate for vertically imposed uniformity.  The EU's 
company law action plan published in 2003 may lead to a further increase in uniformity, but it is too 
early to tell. 
                                                   
217   See Armour, supra note 4, at 18-19. 
218   Of course, the requirements of the Eleventh Company Law Directive must be included in the calculus 
when computing the ease of entering another member state to set up a branch and do business.  However, 
these requirements do not go to the internal affairs of a company, and parallel the light requirements 
imposed on foreign corporations by such states as Delaware. I 
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